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Chapter 1
The Problem of Decision-making
1.1 Introduction
In this thesis, we suppose that an abstract decision problem consists of two
essentials parts. One is a set of conceivable alternatives (or options) from
which a selection has to be made by an individual or a collectivity. Normally,
there are at least two alternatives to be chosen. Otherwise, it is not neces-
sary to make a selection. The other one is a dominance relation over this
set which reflects assessments or preferences concerning alternatives. The
original notion of dominance relation was defined in [66, p37] as that an al-
ternative x dominates another alternative y whenever alternative x, if taken
into consideration, excludes the acceptance of alternative y. It is clear that
dominance relation provides information about the relative goodness or bad-
ness of alternatives. Generally, a dominance relation may be formulated in
a way which takes all the characteristics of the two alternatives into account.
It also could be generated by some coalition consisting of members of the
organization who are together capable of enforcing their preference of an
alternative over another one if only those two alternatives were considered.
We will leave aside the discussion about how this dominance relation was
formed, and assume simply that it is an exogenous variable. Many decision
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problems may be modeled as such a pair. Noted examples are tournaments
and majority voting problems in [32] and [35], coalition formation problems
in [65], multi-criteria decision problems in [4] and [50] and exchange market
problems with indivisible goods in [44] and [55].
A solution for abstract decision problems is any function which assign-
s a single alternative or subset of alternatives to a given decision problem.
Generally, it is the outcome of a choice behaviour which may be based on
some reasonable criteria, a chance mechanism, a religious code, a mysterious
prophecy of an oracle, or even an intrusive advice of a fortune teller. As dom-
inance relation is associated with the evaluation of alternatives, it is logical
to postulate a link between the information contained in this relation and the
solution of abstract decision problems. In this thesis, we consider exclusively
such so-called dominance-based solutions. To be more to the point, given a
dominance relation, what in this dominance relation makes an alternative so
special that it might be chosen. If there exists an alternative that dominates
any other alternatives, referred to as the best alternative, then such an alterna-
tive should be chosen certainly. The key point is that such an alternative does
not exist usually. Therefore, the central question is which alternatives should
be selected on basis of the dominance relation over alternatives when the
best alternative does not exist? The main objective of this thesis is to answer
this question by investigating and revising the dominance-based solutions in
the literature.
Two prestigious notions were proposed in the literature in order to solve
abstract decision problems. One is the notion of maximal alternative set
which is made up of un-dominated alternatives. The rationality of this con-
cept is expressed as that if an alternative x in the maximal alternative set is
proposed, no other alternative can block the acceptance of x. In other words,
if x is reached, it would be maintained and not be replaced by any other al-
ternative. Another one is the notion of stable set proposed by von Neumann
and Morgenstern [66] in their celebrated work Theory of Games and Eco-
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nomic Behavior (1944). Stable set solution specifies a subset of alternatives
V that satisfies the following properties: No alternative in V can block the
acceptance of another possible alterative in V ; If any other alternative y is
proposed, then there is at least one alternative in V that can block the adop-
tion of y. It can be verified that the maximal alternative set and stable set
both coincide with the best alternative set whenever this set exists. There-
fore, both of them could be seen as an extension of the best alternative set.
However, the solutions of maximal alternative set and of stable set may not
exist in abstract decision problems with cyclic dominance relations. There-
fore, a more general solution still needs to be formulated to deal with every
possible abstract decision problem within the framework of this thesis. With
this motivation, we propose and study a series of solutions which may be
considered as variations either of the maximal alternative set or of stable set.
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. In order to formu-
late a general analysis framework for abstract decision problems, we recall
basic notations and properties concerning alternatives, dominance relation
and the solution of abstract decision problems in Section 1.2. We also intro-
duce elementary digraph theory which will be used to represent abstract de-
cision problems and characterize their solutions. In Section 1.3, we present
the theories of maximal alternative set and of stable sets which are theoreti-
cal basis for the other solutions in the sequel chapters. In this section we also
come up with our main research questions. Finally, we give a short overview
of the remaining chapters in Section 1.4. This would be helpful for reader to
tackle the subjects of this thesis.
1.2 Fundamentals of abstract decision problem
This section is dedicated to necessary notations, concepts, techniques and
results concerning abstract decision problems. Our presentations are mainly
from [10], [23] and [65].
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1.2.1 Concepts and notations
An abstract decision problem is presented as a pair (X ;P) where X is a finite
set of alternatives and P is a binary relation defined on X . The alternatives
in X will be denoted by lower case letters x;y;z : : :. Let jV j be the cardinality
of V  X . These decision problems are also known as abstract games or
decision systems in the literature (See [46] and [56] ).
Alternatives in X stand for choices or actions from which some judge-
ment or choice is to be made. The explanation for them depends on the
problem formulations and particular contents considered. For examples, X
may be:
• a set of candidates, proposals or bills faced by a committee from which
a collective decision has to be made;
• a collection of allocations of good among individuals, so that each
alternative consists of a list of the amounts of each goods going to
each individual;
• a set of vectors whose components are values of particular decisions
actually made by the government, such as tax rates, expenditures and
price policies of social enterprise;
• competing projects evaluated on several criteria expressed in in com-
mensurable units, such as comparing car brands for a consumer.
Another term social state was introduced by Arrow in his path-breaking
work Social Choice and Individual Values[3, p17]. It represents the same
thing in different way. A set of alternatives could be infinite. For instance,
the alternative set consists of tax rates that could take on any value between
zero and hundred percent. In this thesis, we restrict our attention to abstract
decision problems with a finite number of alternatives.
1.2 Fundamentals of abstract decision problem 5
A binary relation on X is a subset of ordered pairs (x;y) of elements of X .
If any ordered pair (x;y) belongs to P, we will write xPy instead of (x;y) 2 P
and not xPy if (x;y) =2 P.
Given two binary relations P1; P2 defined on X , P1 is called a sub-relation
of P2 if for any x;y 2 X , xP1y implies xP2y; and it is called a super-relation
of P2 if for any x;y 2 X , xP2y implies xP1y. Let PT be the sub-relation of P
with the restriction to T  X .
For any alternatives x;y2 X , there are four possibilities within one binary
relation that are described as follows:
• x dominates y, which is represented as xPy and not yPx;
• y dominates x, which is represented as yPx and not xPy;
• x is indifferent to y, which is represented as xPy and yPx;
• x and y cannot be compared, which is represented as neither xPy nor
yPx
Next, we present a number of properties that a binary relation may satisfy.
In general, a binary relation may satisfy none of the following properties and
it could also satisfy several properties simultaneously. We will use these
properties throughout this thesis.
Definition 1.2.1 A binary relation P on X is said to be
1. asymmetric : 8x;y 2 X, if xPy then not yPx;
2. complete : 8x;y 2 X, either xPy or yPx;
3. incomplete : if P is not complete;
4. transitive : 8x;y;z 2 X, if xPy and yPz, then xPz;
5. non-transitive : if it is not transitive;
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6. cyclic : 9 x1, x2, : : :, xm 2 X such that x1Px2, x2Px3, : : :, xm 1Pxm,
xmPx1;
7. acyclic : if it is not cyclic;
8. regular : if b(x) = b(y) and d(x) = d(y) for any x;y 2 X;
9. irregular : if it is not regular.
In this thesis, we mainly focus on abstract decision problems with a non-
empty and asymmetric binary relation P on X . This binary relation will be
termed as dominance relation in the sequel. Note that neither transitivity nor
completeness are required for this relation. Denote byW(X) the collection of
these abstract decision problems over X . In particular, denote by T (X) the
set of abstract decision problems on X whose dominance relations are both
asymmetric and complete. Obviously, T (X)  W(X). Abstract decision
problems in T (X) are also known as tournaments in the literature (see [11],
[32] and [38]).
Let x 2 X . Denote by B(X ;P)(x) the set of alternatives that dominate x,
i.e.,
B(X ;P)(x) = fy 2 X j yPxg;
and by D(X ;P)(x) the set of alternatives that are dominated by x. i.e.,
D(X ;P)(x) = fy 2 X j xPyg:
An alternative in B(X ;P)(x) is called a dominator of x and D(x)(X ;P) is termed
as the dominion of x (see [57, p51] and [11, p554] respectively). Denote by
b(X ;P)(x) and d(X ;P)(x) the cardinalities of B(X ;P)(x) and of D(X ;P)(x) respec-
tively. The Copeland Score of x in (X ;P) is defined as
cs(X ;P)(x) = d(X ;P)(x) b(X ;P)(x):
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In order to improve readability, we omit the respective subscript whenever X
and P are known from the context.
For any nonempty T  X , T is called a dominated subset in (X ;P) if yPx
for any x 2 T and y 2 X nT .
Definition 1.2.2 A solution forW(X) is a functionS :W(X)! 2X such that
S (X ;P) X for every (X ;P). Take any two solutionsS andS 0 for W(X).
S 0 is called a refinement of S if S 0(X ;P)  S (X ;P) for any (X ;P) 2
W(X).
For any (X ;P) 2W(X), let s be a permutation of X . Ps is defined as:
xPsy i f s 1(x)Ps 1(y) f or any x;y 2 X :
A solutionS satisfies the property of neutrality if:
S (X ;Ps ) = s [S (X ;P)] f or any (X ;P) 2W(X) and s :
The requirement of neutrality says that a solution should not discriminate
among alternatives. Such constraint imposed on a solution will not cause
much controversy in general.
Definition 1.2.3 A solutionS for W(X) is said to be
(i) a-monotonic: For any (X ;P) 2W(X) and x 2S (X ;P), if P0 = P except
xP0y where y 2 X, then x 2S (X ;P0);
(ii) b -monotonic: For any (X ;P) 2W(X) and x 2S (X ;P), if P0 = P except
xP0y where y 2 X, then x 2S (X ;P0) but y =2S (X ;P0);
(iii) g-monotonic: For any (X ;P) 2W(X) and x 2S (X ;P), if P0 = P except
xP0y where y 2 X, thenS (X ;P0) = fxg.
Note that P0=P except xP0ymeans that (1) xP0y but not xPy; (2) P0Xnfxg=
PXnfxg and P0Xnfyg = PXnfyg. The above definition expresses that a solution
is a-monotonic if a selected alternative is still selected when its dominion is
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reinforced by changing from yPx to xPy or by adding xPy, and that a solu-
tion is b -monotonic if any selected alternative x is reinforced by changing
from yPx to xPy or by adding xPy, then x is still selected but excludes the
acceptance of y, and that a solution is g-monotonic if a selected alternative’s
dominion is reinforced by changing from yPx to xPy or by adding xPy, x
becomes the only selected alternative.
Lemma 1.2.1 LetS be a solution for W(X). Then
(i)S is a-monotonic if it is b -monotonic;
(ii)S is b -monotonic if it is g-monotonic.
Proof. This result follows straightforwardly from Definition 1.2.3. 
Consider a set of voters N = f1; : : : ;ng where n 3 and n is finite. Each
voter i 2 N has a complete, asymmetric and transitive preference i over X .
A preference profile for N, denoted by N , is a collection of preferences i
(one for each voter). For any x;y 2 X , x is said to be majority-preferred to y,
denoted by xM y, if
jfi 2 Nj xi y gj> jf j 2 Nj y j x gj:
It is not difficult to verify that the majority relationM over X is asymmetric
and complete whenever j N j is odd. An alternative x is called Pareto opti-
mal if there does not exist y in X which is unanimously preferred to x. An
alternative x is called Pareto suboptimal if it is not Pareto optimal.
An x2 X is said to be the best in (X ;P) if xPy for all y2 X n x. Denote by
b (X ;P) the collection of best alternatives in (X ;P). As a dominance relation
is asymmetric, there exists at most one best alternative for a given abstract
decision problem in our framework.
Many examples of application demonstrate that the nonexistence of best
alternative is quite common. For instances, majority voting activity and coali-
tion formation in a committee (see [32], [39] and [65]), coalitional games in
[12], the aggregation of multiple criteria decision making (see [4] and [9]),
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etc. Which alternative or subset of alternatives should be considered as the
solution for an abstract decision problem whenever the best alternative does
not exist? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to formulate broad-
er solutions than the best alternative set. Moreover, it is desirable that these
solutions turn out to be the best alternative set whenever this set exists.
1.2.2 Digraph representation
In this subsection, we introduce an auxiliary theory1 which is mainly taken
from the theory of digraph [7] to facilitate the description of abstract decision
problem.
A digraph D= (V;E) is a finite and non-empty set V together with a set
E which consists of ordered pairs of distinct elements of V . The set V is
called the vertex set of D and each element of V is a vertex. E is called a
directed edge set and each element of E is called a directed edge. Instead
of (x;y) 2 E we write xEy. A sub-graph S = (W;F) of D is a graph where
W V and F  E \ (W W ).
In order to describe the properties of digraphs, we introduce the following
concepts:
• A chain of a digraph D= (V;E) is an alternating sequence of vertices
and edges
x0; x0Ex1; x1; x1Ex2; : : : ; xn 1Exn; xn
beginning and ending with vertices in which each edge is incident with
the two vertices immediately preceding and following it.
1Another way to represent an abstract decision problem (X ;P) is to associate each alter-
native of X a row and a column of square matrix MP of dimension X . The element MPxy of
this matrix, being at the intersection of the row associate to x and at the intersection of the
column associated to y, is 1 if xPy and 0 otherwise. See more details for such representation
in [10, p53].
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• A chain is said to be closed if x0 = xn and open otherwise. If a chain is
closed, it is called a cycle, provided its vertices (other than x0 and xn)
are distinct and n 2.
• A cycle is called complete if it contains every vertex of V .
• A cycle x1, x1Px2, : : :, xn 1Pxn, xn;xnPx1 is called an even cycle (or
odd cycle) if n is even number (or odd number).
For any x;y2V , define xEty as there exists a chain from x to y. A digraph
(V;E) is called:
• acyclic if it does not contain any cycle;
• connected if either xEty or yEtx for any x;y 2V ;
• strongly connected if xEty and yEtx for any x;y 2V .
For any digraph (V;E), the strong component of (V;E) is a subgraph
(W;EW ) where (i) eitherW consists of a single vertex or (W;EW ) is strongly
connected; (ii) no proper super-graph of (W;EW ) is strongly connected.
The contraction of (V;E) is a digraph (V ;Econ) where
1. V  = fV 1 ; : : : ;V s g is the vertex sets of strong components of (V;E);
2. for any V i ;V j 2V , V i EconV j if there are x 2V i ;y 2V j with xEy.
The contraction of (V;E) is the collapsing of each strong component into
one single point enriched with a binary relation between those points.
Lemma 1.2.2 Let (V;E) be a digraph. (V ;Econ) is acyclic.
Proof. The proof was given in [7, p327-328]. 
The above lemma says that the contraction of a digraph does not contain
any cycle. In the rest of this thesis, we represent an abstract decision prob-
lem (X ;P) as a digraph where X is considered as the vertex set V and P is
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described as directed edge set E in such a way that two vertices x and y are
jointed by an open simple arc oriented from x to y if and only if x dominates y.
Clearly, the contraction of (X ;P) is also an abstract decision problem where
alternatives are the vertex sets of strong components and dominance relation
is Pcon that is acyclic, as showed in Lemma 1.2.2.
Definition 1.2.4 Let (X ;P) 2W(X) and x;y 2 X. We say that
(1) x t-dominates y, denoted by xPty, if
xPy or xPx1; x1Px2; : : : ; xmPy
where x1, x2, : : :, xm 2 X;
(2) x strictly t-dominates y, denoted by xcPty, if xPty but not yPtx:
It can be easily verified that Pt is transitive but not necessary asymmetric.
Moreover, Pt is the intersection of all transitive binary relations on X that
contain P (see [63, p12]). Pt is also known as the transitive closure of P and
chain dominance relation in [65].
We end this subsection with an example that was given in [53, p142] to
illustrate the concepts in this subsection.
Example 1.2.1 Consider (X ;P) where X = fx1;x2; : : : ;x12g and P is de-
scribed as follows:
• x1Px2; x2Px3; x3Px4; x4Px1; x3Px1; x2Px4;
• x6Px7; x7Px8; x8Px6; x8Px9;
• x9Px10; x10Px11; x11Px9; x12Px9;
• x3Px5; x6Px5; x9Px5.
Then, (X ;P) is represented by Figure 1.1 and its contraction is presented in
Figure 1.2, where
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x1
x3
x6
x7
x8
x9 x10
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x12
x5
x4
x2
Fig. 1.1 (X ;P)
X2
*
X1
*
X5
*
X3
*
X4
*
Fig. 1.2 (X;Pcon)
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• X1 = fx1;x2;x3;x4g,
• X2 = fx6;x7;x8g, X3 = fx5g,
• X4 = fx9;x10;x11g, X5 = fx12g.
1.3 Research gap and problem formulation
Due to the possible emptiness of the best alternative set, many extensions
and modifications of this solution were proposed in the literature. In this
thesis, we will investigates part of them which have close connections with
the theory of maximal alternative set in [65] and theory of stable sets in [66].
For this reason, it is necessary to present these two theories in details as a
preparation for our theories.
1.3.1 The theory of maximal alternative set
In this subsection, we discuss a well-known solution concept called maximal
alternative set. This notion is equivalent to the game theoretical concept of
a core (See [40] and [59]).
Definition 1.3.1 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). An x 2 X is said to be maximal for P if
yPx for no y 2 X. Let m(X ;P) be the collection of maximal alternatives in
(X ;P). That is
m(X ;P) = fx 2 X j yPx f or no y 2 Xg:
Usually, a maximal alternative may not be unique. A solution is said to
be core-inclusive if it contains the maximal alternative set. Since for any
x;y 2 m(X ;P), neither xPy nor yPx, the solution of maximal alternative set
is free from inner contradiction in the sense that no selected alternative is
dominated by another selected one. In general, given x 2 m(X ;P) and y 2
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X nm(X ;P), neither xPy nor xPty is necessary. To clarify this, consider the
following example.
Example 1.3.1 Reconsider (X ;P) in Figure 1.1. We get m(X ;P) = fx12g.
However,
neither x12Pxi nor x12Ptxi f or any xi 2 X nfx5;x9;x10;x11g:
It is easy to show that m(X ;P) = b (X ;P) if P is complete. The main dis-
tinction between b (X ;P) and m(X ;P) is obvious if P is incomplete. To see
this, reconsider (X ;P) in Figure 1.1. As x12 is not dominated by any alterna-
tive, it belongs to the maximal alternative set. But no best alternative exists
in this case. Whenever the best alternative does not exist, but a maximal one
does, the maximal alternative set can be chosen as the next best solution. The
following theorem states a sufficient condition for the presence of maximal
alternative.
Theorem 1.3.1 (Suzumura 2009) For any (X ;P) 2W(X), m(X ;P) 6= /0 if P
is acyclic.
Proof. The proof of this result was given in [63, p14]. 
Note that m(X ;P) is not necessary to be empty even if P is cyclic. As
we showed, the dominance relation P presented in Figure 1.1 is cyclic while
m(X ;P) is nonempty. Thus, acyclicity is a sufficient but not necessary condi-
tion for the existence of maximal alternative.
For any (X ;P) 2 W(X), denote by m(X;Pcon) the set of the vertex sets
of strong components that are maximal with respect to Pcon. That is,
m(X;Pcon) = fXi 2 X j Xj PconXi f or no Xj 2 Xg:
The next theorem gives a sufficient and necessary condition for the existence
of maximal alternative.
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x2
x3
x4
x5
x6
x7
x1
Fig. 1.3 (X ;P)
Theorem 1.3.2 (van Deemen 1991) Let (X ;P) 2W(X). Then
x is maximal i f and only i f fxg 2 m(X;Pcon):
Proof. The proof of this result was given in [65, p97]. 
According to the above result, the existence problem of maximal alterna-
tive in (X ;P) can be converted into the existence problem of special maximal
strong component in (X;Pcon). That is, an abstract decision problem has a
maximal alternative if and only if its contraction contains a maximal point
that comprises exactly one alternative. Theorem 1.3.2 implies the following
important fact.
Corollary 1.3.1 (van Deemen 1991) Let (X ;P)2W(X). If (X ;P) is strongly
connected, then m(X ;P) = /0.
Notice that strong connectedness of (X ;P) is not a necessary condition
for the emptiness of the maximal alternative set.
Example 1.3.2 Consider (X ;P) in Figure 1.3. Since neither x7Ptx6 nor
x6Ptx7, (X ;P) is not strongly connected. However, the maximal alternative
set of (X ;P) is empty.
Theorem 1.3.2 and Corollary 1.3.1 show that maximal alternatives do not
exist whenever each maximal strong component in (X ;P) consists of at least
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two alternatives. In this case, the question arises: which subset of alternatives
should be considered as a solution for (X ;P). To address this question, it is
necessary to formulate a broader notion of maximality than that of maximal
alternative set which could deal with every possible dominance relation in
our framework. For this reason, we come up with the following research
question:
Question 1: Does there exist a variation of maximal alternative set which
is nonempty for every abstract decision problem and coincides with the best
alternative set whenever such set exists?
1.3.2 The theory of stable sets
The notion of stable sets was originally formulated in [66] for the solution of
cooperative games and termed as the theory of solutions. As it does not in-
volve any structural feature of characteristic function of cooperative games,
it was subsequently applied to solve abstract decision problems which are
more general kinds of games. To avoid confusion with other solution con-
cepts, we employ the term stable set that was firstly used in [59].
Definition 1.3.2 Let (X ;P) 2 W(X). A set V  X is called a stable set of
(X ;P) if it satisfies
(i) internal stability: 8x;y 2V, not xPy;
(ii) external stability: 8y 2 X nV, there is an x 2V such that xPy.
Let S(X ;P) denote the collection of stable sets of (X ;P). Internal stability
says that no alternative in a stable set is dominated by another alternative in
this same set. This condition demonstrates that no discrimination can be
made among the alternatives in a stable set. External stability expresses that
any alternative outside a stable set is dominated by an alternative inside this
set. This condition shows that a stable set as a whole can dominate all the
alternatives outsides this set. It is worth noting that external stability does not
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Homo economicus Homo sociologicus
Pioneer Adam Smith Emile Durkheim
Terminology instrumental rationality social norm
Major feature if you want to achieve x , do Á do x ; or do not do x
Table 1.1 Homo Economicus verses Homo Sociologicus
exclude the situation where an alternative inside a stable set is dominated by
another alternative outside this set.
Example 1.3.3 Reconsider (X ;P) in Figure 1.3, we have
S(X ;P) = ffx1;x3;x6;x7g;fx2;x4;x5gg:
It can be verified that for any xi 2 fx2;x4;x5g 2 S(X ;P), there exists an x j 2
X nfx2;x4;x5g such that x jPxi. The same holds for the other stable set.
The notion of stable sets was described as "accepted standard of be-
havior" connected with social organization in [66, p41]. Internal stability
says that the standard of behavior is free from inner contradiction. That is,
no alternative in a stable set can be upset by another alternative inside this
set. Therefore, it precludes completely the presence of inner inconsistency.
This condition guarantees that the alternatives inside a stable set are evenly
matched. External stability states that the standard of behaviour may prevent
the occurrence of unreasonable substitution. Since every alternative not be-
longing to a stable setV can be upset by an alternative y belonging toV , even
though an alternative x outside V dominates another alternative y inside V , y
will in return be dominated by a third alternative z inside V .
It was emphasized by Shubik [59, p161] that a stable set can be viewed
as a tradition, a social convention, a cannon of orthodoxy, or an ethical norm.
In this respect, the notion of stable sets differs essentially from that of max-
imal alternative set. The notion of maximality belongs to the perspective of
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homo economicus whereas the concept of stability belongs to the perspective
of homo sociologicus, as accurately classified by [34]. The fundamental dif-
ferences between these orientations are briefly summarized in Table 1.1. See
more details about their differences in [34].
Definition 1.3.3 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). An alternative x 2 X is said to be
(i) stable in (X ;P) if there is a V 2 S(X ;P) with x 2V;
(ii) instable in (X ;P) if there is no V 2 S(X ;P) with x 2V.
The above definition will be useful for explaining the features of stable
set solution in the sequel. One characterization of stable sets was proposed
in [64] by using internal stability and external stability as follows.
Theorem 1.3.3 (Van Deemen 1991) Let (X ;P) 2W(X) and V 2 S(X ;P).
(i) V is maximal in terms of set inclusion with respect to internal stability;
(ii) V is minimal in terms of set inclusion with respect to external stability.
Proof. The proof was given in [64, p258-259]. 
This theorem expresses the fact that if V is a stable set of (X ;P), neither
its proper subset nor its superset is a stable set. It is worth emphasizing
that stable set solution is neither cardinality maximal with respect to internal
stability nor cardinality minimal with respect to external stability2.
Example 1.3.4 Reconsider (X ;P) in Figure 1.3. fx2;x4;x6;x7g satisfies in-
ternal stability but it is not a stable set of (X ;P). fx1;x3;x6;x7g is a stable
set whereas fx2;x4;x5g satisfies external stability as well.
The solution of stable set, however, may not exist in some cyclic circum-
stances. To see this, consider the following example.
2A solution S of (X ;P) is said to be (i) cardinality maximal with respect to inter-
nal stability if there does not exist any other solution S 0 that satisfies internal stability
and jS 0(X ;P)j > jS (X ;P)j; (ii) cardinality minimal with respect to external stability if
there does not exist any other solution S 0 that satisfies external stability and jS 0(X ;P)j <
jS (X ;P)j.
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x2
x3
x4
x1
Fig. 1.4 (X ;P)
Example 1.3.5 Reconsider (X ;P) in Figure 1.1. There exist the following
three odd cycles in P:
x1Px2; x2Px3; x3Px1; x1Px2; x2Px4; x4Px1; x6Px7; x7Px8; x8Px6:
Due to their existences, no stable set exists in (X ;P).
However, stable set solution always exists whenever dominance relation
does not contain any odd cycle. Moreover, an given abstract decision prob-
lem may have more than one stable set, as we have shown in Example 1.3.3.
The uniqueness of this solution is guaranteed as long as dominance relation
is acyclic.
Theorem 1.3.4 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). Then
(i) (Richardson 1953) there exists a stable set if P does not contain any odd
cycle;
(ii) (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944) there exists a unique stable set
if P is acyclic.
Proof. The proofs were given in [45, p578] and [66, p598-599]. 
Note that an abstract decision problem with an odd dominance cycle may
also have a nonempty stable set. To verify this, see the following example.
Example 1.3.6 Consider (X ;P) in Figure 1.4. We have
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S(X ;P) = ffx1;x3gg
in spite of the existence of x2Px3, x3Px4 and x4Px2.
A stronger sufficient condition for the existence of stable sets can be
found in [17] and [45, p578]. To our knowledge, the sufficient and necessary
condition for the existence of stable set is still unknown. See [33] for an
excellent review of the state of knowledge about that time.
Intuitively, given a stable alternative x, it should be still stable when ex-
tending the dominion of x while it might be discredited into an instable one
by enlarging the dominion of some instable alternative. Furthermore, it is
desirable that a solution is independent from the modification of dominance
relation between alternatives outside this solution. The following remark
shows that stable set solution does not possess the former property but satis-
fy the latter one.
Remark 1.3.1 Let (X ;P) 2W(X) and V 2 S(X ;P).
(i) Take x 2 V. If P0 = P except xP0y where y 2 X, it is possible that x is
instable in (X ;P0);
(ii) Take x 2 V and y 2 X nV. If P0 = P except yP0z where z 2 X, then x is
still stable in (X ;P0) ;
(iii) If P0V[fyg = PV[fyg for any y 2 X nV, then V 2 S(X ;P0).
See the detailed exposition concerning the above remak in [16]. The next
theorem shows that stable set solution is core-inclusive, and that the solution
of stable set agrees with the maximal alternative set whenever dominance
relation is transitive.
Theorem 1.3.5 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). Then
(i) (Van Deemen 1991) m(X ;P)V for any V 2 S(X ;P);
(ii) S(X ;P) = fm(X ;P)g if P is transitive.
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Proof. (i) Suppose that there is a V 2 S(X ;P) such that m(X ;P)  V . Then
there exists an x 2 m(X ;P) but x =2V . Hence, there is a y 2V such that yPx.
Contradiction.
(ii) If P is transitive, then P is acyclic. By Theorem 1.3.4-(ii), there
exists a unique stable set V for (X ;P). Suppose m(X ;P) 6= V . Take any
x 2V nm(X ;P), there exist y2 X nV and z2V such that yPx and zPy, which
implies zPx. Contradiction. 
As we have shown, both the solutions of stable set and of maximal alter-
native set might not exist for a given abstract decision problem. Moreover,
an abstract decision problem may have a stable set but without the maximal
alternative set, and it is also possible that a given abstract decision problem
does not have any stable set but have the maximal alternative set. For in-
stances, (X ;P) in Figure 1.1 has the maximal alternative set while no stable
set exists in this case; and (X ;P) in Figure 1.3 does no have the maximal
alternative set but has two stable sets, which also confirm an important fac-
t that the notion of stable set is incompatible with the concept of maximal
alternative set.
As the solution of stable sets fails to exist in some abstract decision prob-
lems with odd dominance cycles, it is desirable to propose an alternative
theory that accommodates the shortcomings of stable set theory. With this
purpose, we put forward our second research question as follows:
Question 2: Is it possible to formulate a variation of von Neumann-
Morgenstern’s stability which is able to deal with every abstract decision
problem and agrees with the best alternative set whenever this set exists?
1.4 The outline of this thesis
The rest of this thesis consists of three parts. Part I is made up of Chapter 2
and Chapter 3. In this part, we will discuss four variations of the maximal
alternative set. These variations retain the essences of maximality. That is,
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each of them chooses alternatives which are maximal in accordance with
a new binary relation deduced from the underlying dominance relation P.
By doing so, we attempt to answer the first research question. Part II is
composed of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 which are dedicated to answering
the second research question. In this part, we will study four variations of
stable set theory. The variations in Chapter 4 concentrate on defining new
binary relations based on the original dominance relation. With these new
binary relations, the solution of stable set was revisited. In other words,
stable sets are defined not based on the initial dominance relation P, but
on binary relations derived from P. In contrast, Chapter 5 focuses on the
reconstruction of criteria of internal stability and external stability of stable
sets. That is, we reformulate the notion of stability defined by Neumann-
Morgenstern instead of redefining a new binary relation. Finally, we end our
thesis with Part III whereby we summarize our main findings in this thesis
and analysis their implications.
In Chapter 2, we study the theory of admissible set and that of uncovered
set. Section 2.2 is devoted to the solution of admissible set that was original-
ly formulated in [29]. We first discourse three equivalent definitions of this
solution which may reveal its properties from different perspectives. Then
we expound one characterization and two axiomatizations concerning this
solution. We also discuss its relations with the maximal alternative set and
stable sets. Finally, the shortcomings of admissible set theory will be pointed
out. These shortcomings can be partly accommodated by the theory of un-
covered set which will be studied in Section 2.3. We discuss the property of
monotonicity possessed by the uncovered set, and expound the characteriza-
tion and axiomatization of this solution. We also compare the uncovered set
with the solutions of maximal alternative set, of stable sets and of admissible
set. Lastly, it will be shown that the solution of uncovered set may lose its
power to discriminate among alternatives in spite of the fact that dominance
relation is irregular.
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In order to formulate a more decisive solution than the uncovered set, we
investigate its two refinements in Chapter 3. Section 3.2 is devoted to the
theory of Copeland winner set introduced in [13]. We first present an axiom-
atization of this solution, and show that the Copeland winner set is a proper
subset of X as long as P is complete and irregular. We also compare it with
the solutions discussed in the previous chapters. It will be revealed that the
Copeland winner set might be a dominated subset of the uncovered set and
is not core-inclusive in general. Duo to these facts, we propose an alterna-
tive refinement of the uncovered set called unsurpassed set in Section 3.3.
It will be proved that the unsurpassed set solution performs better than the
uncovered set solution and overcomes the mentioned deficiency of Copeland
winner set in discriminating among alternatives. Furthermore, we will show
that the solution of unsurpassed set is more sensitive than the uncovered set
solution but less sensitive than the Copeland winner set solution to the rein-
forcement of selected alternative’s dominion. Besides, we will investigate its
relations with the solutions discussed in the previous chapters. We end this
chapter with an application case to show the working of these theories.
Chapter 4 focus on the theories of generalized stable sets and of extended
stable sets. In Section 4.2, we discuss the solution of generalized stable sets
that are stable sets defined in terms of Pt . We will present several charac-
terizations of this solution and explore the relationships between generalized
stable sets and the solutions discussed in the previous chapters. Since a given
abstract decision problem may have many generalized stable sets and some
of them may contain Pareto suboptimal alternatives, we refine the collec-
tion of generalized stable sets to pick out more convincing ones. In Section
4.3, we study the theory of extended stable sets by introducing an extended
dominance relation which is in between P and Pt . Subsequently, stable sets
are defined for this extended dominance relation which are called extended
stable sets. We characterize this solution and and show nonempty extended
stable sets always exist for every abstract decision problem. Moreover, we
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discuss its relations with stable sets and generalized stable sets. We end this
chapter with a case of multi-criteria decision analysis to show the application
of these two theories.
Chapter 5 is devoted to the theories of m-stable sets and of w-stable sets
which are obtained by redefining the stability conditions of stable sets. In
Section 5.2, we study the solution of m-stable sets. We characterize this so-
lution and explore its relationships with stable set, generalized stable sets
and extended stable sets. Finally, we discuss a selection procedure over the
collection of m-stable sets. By using it, a particular m-stable set can be fil-
tered out. To overcome the disadvantages of m-stable sets, we propose an
alternative reformulation of stable sets called w-stable set in Section 5.3. We
characterize this solution and prove that w-stable sets exist and are proper
subsets of X for any abstract decision problem. We also make a comparison
between w-stable sets and m-stable sets, and investigate its relations with the
other variants of stable sets in Chapter 4. Similarly, to narrow the collection
of w-stable sets, we also propose a selection procedure by which more attrac-
tive and decisive w-stable sets can be picked out. Lastly, we present a case of
exchange market with indivisible goods to illustrate the applicability of our
theories in Section 5.4.
In Chapter 6, we present some general conclusions about the solution-
s discussed in this thesis. By doing so, we would like to show what the
relations among these solutions are and how the two research questions for-
mulated in Chapter 1 are answered. Finally, in Chapter 7, we give a summary
over conclusions of each chapter which may help readers to view our main
conclusions in this thesis quickly.
Part I
Variations of the Maximal
Alternative Set

Chapter 2
Two Extensions of the Maximal
Alternative Set
2.1 Introduction
Due to the possible emptiness of the maximal alternative set, many exten-
sions of this set have been proposed in the literature. These extensions could
be roughly divided into two categories. The strategy followed by the solu-
tions in the first category is to delete or add or alter particular instances of
the dominance relation under some regularity condition which guarantees
the existences of maximal alternative for this resulting dominance relation.
Usually, there exist more than one such resulting relations. The union of
maximal alternatives for these resulting relations is considered as the choice
set of abstract decision problem. For instances, given an abstract decision
problem (X ;P), the Banks set in [6] selects the maximal alternatives of max-
imally (with respect to inclusion) complete and transitive sub-relations of
P whereas the un-captured set in [18] chooses the maximal alternatives of
maximally (with respect to inclusion) transitive sub-relations of P. See other
examples in [2], [18] and [60]. The solutions in the second category take
the strategy that first, construct a new dominance relation based on the initial
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dominance relation, and then choose the alternatives that are maximal with
respect to this derived dominance relation. Examples are the admissible set
in [29], the uncovered set in [38], the Copeland winner set in [13] and the
k-uncovered set in [31].
In this chapter, we investigate two noted solutions belonging to the sec-
ond class of those extensions. These are the solutions of admissible set and of
uncovered set. The theory of admissible set was originally proposed by [29]
which is equivalent to the theories of generalized optimal choice sets in [53]
and of dynamic solution in [56]. One pleasant advantage of this theory is that
it can yield a nonempty solution for every possible abstract decision problem.
However, the admissible set may include every alternative under considera-
tion. In this case, this solution does not discriminate among alternatives at all.
Another shortcoming of this solution is that it may contains Pareto subopti-
mal alternatives when dominance relation is deduced from pairwise majority
comparison. In view of these points, the theory of uncovered set was pro-
posed by [38] to remove these shortcomings of the admissible set. It will
be shown that the uncovered set is contained in the admissible set in every
tournament and precludes the existence of Pareto-suboptimal alternatives if
dominance relation is deduced from pairwise majority comparison. As this
solution is definable for any abstract decision problem no matter its domi-
nance relations is complete or incomplete, we generalize it from T (X) and
W(X) to cover a wider range of decision problems in this chapter.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we present
the theory of admissible set. The results discussed in this section are mainly
from [29], [53] and [65]. In Section 2.3, we study the theory of uncovered
set. In addition to the well-known results from [38] and [39], we also present
some new conclusions which are mainly about the properties of the uncov-
ered set inW(X) and investigate its relations with the maximal alternative set
and the solution of stable sets.
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2.2 The theory of admissible set
The admissible set solution was originally proposed in [29] as follows.
Definition 2.2.1 Let (X ;P) 2 W(X). The admissible set of (X ;P) is defined
as:
AD(X ;P) = fx 2 X j i f yPtx; then xPty f or any y 2 Xg:
As clarified in [28, p236], the requirement for the admissible set was
motivated by the stability notion of bargaining set in [5] which rests on the
idea that an objection is not justified if it has a counter-objection. In order
to display the relation between the notion of admissible set and the notion of
maximality, we reformulate the notation of admissible set as follows:
Definition 2.2.2 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). A subset V  X is the admissible set of
(X ;P) if
V = fx 2 X j ycPtx f or no y 2 Xg:
This alternative notation expresses that the admissible set is made up
of alternatives which are maximal with respect to cPt . That is, AD(X ;P) =
m(X ;cPt). As a comparison, the maximal alternative set is made up of alter-
natives which are maximal with respect to P. Based on this point, we classify
the admissible set as a variation of the maximal alternative set.
SincecPt is transitive, the admissible set is always nonempty. Notice thatcPt is neither a sub-relation nor a super-relation of P. That means, given
x;y 2 X , neither xcPty implies xPy nor xPy indicates xcPty.
Example 2.2.1 Reconsider (X ;P) in Figure 1.3. We have
m(X ;P) = /0 whereas AD(X ;P) = fx1;x2;x3;x4g:
Moreover, it can be verified that
x1cPtx5 but not x1Px5 whereas x2Px3 but not x2cPtx3:
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Two equivalent definitions of the admissible set were independently pro-
posed in the literature. These are the generalized optimal choice sets in [53]
and the dynamic solution in [56]. See [56] and [65] for the proofs concerning
the equivalence of these definitions. Since different definitions may expound
the rationality of admissible set from different perspectives, we represent
them specifically to figure out these points.
Definition 2.2.3 Let (X ;P) 2 W(X). A subset V  X is called the general-
ized optimal choice sets of (X ;P) if
V =
[
fT  X j T is a minimal un dominated subset o f Xg
where T is a minimal un-dominated subset of X if
(i) T is un-dominated: not yPx for any x 2 T and y 2 X nT;
(ii) there is no T 0  T (T 6= /0) such that T 0 is un-dominated.
Requirement (i) guarantees that the selected alternatives in T are at least
as good as any alternative outside T . This does not mean that for every
alternative x outside T , there is a y belonging to T such that yPx. Moreover,
it does not preclude the situation that an alternative x in T is dominated by
another alternative y in T . Condition (ii) is a property of minimality with
respect to set inclusion which makes sure there are no good grounds for
narrowing T further to a proper subset of T .
In practice, an alternative in the solution may be achieved by means of
dynamics of negotiation or transition mechanism. But the above equivalent
concept is static in nature, as argued in [56]. In comparison, the concept of
dynamic solution may reflect this dynamic aspects of decision making.
Definition 2.2.4 Let (X ;P) 2 W(X). A subset V  X is called the dynamic
solution of (X ;P) if
V =
[
fT  X j T is an elementary d  solution o f Xg
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where T is an elementary d-solution of X if
(i) for any x;y 2 T , xPty and yPtx;
(ii) not yPtx for any x 2 T and y 2 X nT .
Condition (i) shows that if the players make a transition (in the consid-
eration of alternatives) from x to y, then it is possible that the players will
consider again the alternative x in the future. The requirement of condition
(ii) ensures that V is externally stable in the following sense that if players
are considering x in V at some time, then they will never consider any alter-
native that is not in V in the future. Therefore, condition (i) and condition
(ii) guarantee that dynamic solution are both internally stable and externally
stable in a dynamic sense.
2.2.1 The properties of admissible set
We say that a solutionS for abstract decision problems satisfies
Condorcet Transitivity: Let x;y 2 X . y 2S (X ;P) if x 2S (X ;P) and yPx.
The Condorcet transitivity says that any alternative dominating some cho-
sen alternative must be chosen as well. The following theorem shows that
the admissible set could be characterized by this property in the domain of
tournaments
Theorem 2.2.1 (Schwartz 1972) Let (X ;P) 2 T (X). AD(X ;P) is a unique
smallest solution (with respect to inclusion) satisfies Condorcet transitivity.
Proof. The proof was given in [39, p273-274]. 
According to the above theorem, it is easy to verify that any alternative
in the admissible set dominates any alternative outside the admissible set
when an abstract decision problem is a tournament. This result relies on the
assumption of the completeness of dominance relation. It may not hold if
dominance relation is incomplete. To confirm this point, consider the follow-
ing example.
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Fig. 2.1 (X ;P)
Example 2.2.2 Consider (X ;P) in Figure 2.1. We get
AD(X ;P) = fx1;x3;x4;x5g:
Clearly, both fx1g and fx3;x4;x5g satisfy Condorcet transitivity.
Due to the equivalence relation between the admissible set and general-
ized optimal choice sets, the axiomatization of generalized optimal choice
sets proposed in [52] could be used to illustrate the feature of admissible set
as well.
Theorem 2.2.2 (Schwartz 1972) Let (X ;P) 2 W(X). The admissible set is
the unique nonempty solutionS satisfying:
Axiom 1: No alternative in X nS (X ;P) dominates any alternative from
S (X ;P);
Axiom 2: For any T S (X ;P), if no alternative inS (X ;P)nT dominates
any alternative in T , then no alternative in T dominates any alterna-
tive inS (X ;P)nT;
Axiom 3: For any T X, if no alternative in X nT dominates any alternative
in T , then some alternative in T belongs toS (X ;P).
Proof. The proof was given in [52, p113-117]. 
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Axiom 1 says that no unchosen alternative dominates any chosen alter-
native, which guarantees that selected alternatives are at least as good as any
unchosen one. Axiom 2 is a reasonable requirement in the following sense:
If no alternative in S (X ;P) nT dominates any alternative in T , then the al-
ternatives in S (X ;P) nT are not worse than any alternative in T . Suppose
there exists an x 2 T dominates a y in S (X ;P) nT . That means x is better
than y. Then there may be good grounds for narrowing S further to T . Ax-
iom 3 expresses that suppose no alternative in X nT bears dominance to any
alternative in T , then the alternatives in T are at least as good as any alter-
native in X nT . Then, the choice from X may be narrowed to T . Therefore,
it is not controversial that some optimal selection from T is also an optimal
alternative from X .
The following theorem shows a structural feature of the admissible set
which was obtained by using the technique of contraction.
Theorem 2.2.3 (Van Deemen 1991) Let (X ;P) 2W(X). Then
V = AD(X ;P) i f and only i f V =
[
Xi 2m(X;Pcon)
Xi :
Proof. The proof was given in [65, p101]. 
The above theorem expresses the fact that the admissible set consists
of alternatives chosen from maximal strong components. To illustrate the
point of this result, reconsider (X ;P) in Figure 1.1 where m(X;Pcon) =
fX1 ;X2 ;X5 g. By Theorem 2.2.3, the admissible set is the union of X1 , X2
and X5 . That is, AD(X ;P) = fx1;x2;x3;x4;x6;x7;x8;x12g:
Corollary 2.2.1 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). Then
AD(X ;P) = X i f and only i f (X ;P) is strongly connected:
The above result follows directly from Theorem 2.2.3. It says that the dis-
criminative power of admissible set is disappearing in front of cases where
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dominance relations are cycles involving all the alternatives under consider-
ation.
2.2.2 The relations with other solutions
In this subsection, we investigate the relation between the admissible set and
the maximal alternative set, and compare the notion of admissible set with
that of stable sets.
Theorem 2.2.4 For any (X ;P) 2W(X), m(X ;P) AD(X ;R).
Proof. Let x 2 m(X ;P). Then fxg 2 m(X;Pcon). According to Theorem
2.2.3, we get x 2 AD(X ;P). 
The above theorem shows that the admissible set is core-inclusive. Given
an x in the admissible set, there may exist a y in this set such that yPx. More-
over, AD(X ;R) m(X ;P) does not hold in general. Thus, the admissible set
can be seen as an extension of the maximal alternative set.
The next theorem displays the relation between the notion of admissible
set and that of stability formulated in [66].
Theorem 2.2.5 (Kalai et al. 1977) Let (X ;P) 2W(X). Then
(i) for any x;y 2 AD(X ;P), not xcPty;
(ii) for any y 2 X nAD(X ;P), there is an x 2 AD(X ;P) such that xcPty.
Proof. AscPt is transitive, this result follows from Theorem 1.3.5-(ii) . 
The stable set solution is a subset of X which satisfies internal stability
and external stability defined with respect to P whereas the admissible set is
a subset of X which satisfies internal stability and external stability defined
with regard to cPt . Therefore, the admissible set could be seen as a varia-
tion of stable set as well. The theory of admissible set always produces a
nonempty solution for every abstract decision problem while this is not true
for the theory of stable sets. In addition, the admissible set permits that an
alternative inside this set is dominated by other alternatives in the same kind
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but prevents the alternative inside this set from being dominated by any al-
ternative outside this set. In contrast, the solution of stable set requires that
no alternative inside a stable set dominates any other alternative in the same
set, but it is allowed that an alternative outside the stable set dominates some
alternative inside this set. In this respect, the theory of admissible set differs
fundamentally from the theory of stable sets.
2.2.3 Concluding remark
The theory of admissible set has some appealing properties. First, the admis-
sible set is nonempty and unique for every abstract decision problem. Thus,
the theory of admissible set solves the existence problem of solution. Sec-
ond, the admissible set is core-inclusive. That means, the admissible set is
a broader solution than the maximal alternative set. Third, no alternative
outside the admissible set dominates any alternative inside this set. This
property ensures that no alternative outside the selected set is preferred to
the selected alternatives. Based on these facts, we deem that the theory of
admissible set improves the theory of maximal alternative set.
However, the theory of admissible set also suffers from some disadvan-
tages. As showing in Corollary 2.2.1, the admissible set might be too large
such that it include all the alternatives under consideration. In this circum-
stance, the admissible set does not discriminate among alternatives at all.
Another disadvantage of this solution may arise when dominance relation is
derived from pairwise majority comparison. In this case, the admissible set
may contain alternatives which are Pareto suboptimal. This drawback was
nicely pointed out in [15]. To verify these points, we present the following
example.
Example 2.2.3 Consider (X ;P) where X consists of five proposals denoted
by x1, x2, x3, x4, x5 and P is formulated by aggregating the following three
agents’ preferences over X with paiewise majority comparison (Each agent
is endowed with asymmetric, complete and transitive preference  over X):
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• agent 1: x4  x1  x2  x5  x3;
• agent 2: x3  x4  x2  x1  x5;
• agent 3: x5  x3  x4  x2  x1:
For any x;y 2 X, xPy if and only if xM y. P is presented in Figure 2.2. As
x1Px5; x5Px3; x3Px4; x4Px2 and x2Px1;
we get that (X ;P) is strongly connected. By Corollary 2.2.1, we have
AD(X ;P) = fx1;x2;x3;x4;x5g:
Clearly, the admissible set is poorly decisive in this case. Moreover, as x4
is unanimously preferred to x1 and x2, both x1 and x2 are Pareto suboptimal.
However, neither x1 nor x2 is excluded from the admissible set.
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In view of the above facts, it is meaningful to construct a more refined
theory than the theory of admissible set. For this reason, we present an alter-
native solution theory which may accommodate partly the above disadvan-
tages of admissible set theory in the next section.
2.3 The theory of uncovered set
The solution of uncovered set was originally proposed in [38] for tourna-
ments whereby dominance relations are both asymmetric and complete. An
equivalent definition was independently proposed in [22]. Because the un-
covered set is also applicable to asymmetric but incomplete dominance rela-
tions, we generalize this notion to cover a broader class of abstract decision
problems.
Definition 2.3.1 Let (X ;P) 2 W(X). The uncovered set of (X ;P) is defined
as:
UC(X ;P) = fx 2 X j y covers x f or no y 2 Xg
where y covers x, denoted by yPcx, if yPx, B(y) B(x) and D(x) D(y).
The above definition says that y covers x if y dominates x and any alter-
native z dominating y also dominates x, and any alternative k dominated by x
is also dominated by y, and that the uncovered set is made up of those alter-
natives which are maximal with regards to the covering relation Pc. That is,
UC(X ;P) = m(X ;Pc).
Example 2.3.1 Reconsider (X ;P) in Figure 2.2. We have
B(x1) = fx2;x3;x4g and D(x1) = fx5g;
B(x2) = fx3;x4g and D(x2) = fx1;x5g;
B(x3) = fx5g and D(x3) = fx1;x2;x4g;
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B(x4) = fx3g and D(x4) = fx1;x2;x5g;
B(x5) = fx1;x2;x4g and D(x5) = fx3g:
The covering relation Pc is expressed in Figure 2.3. Then we have
UC(X ;P) = fx3;x4;x5g while AD(X ;P) = X :
Remark 2.3.1 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). Then
(i) Pc is a transitive sub-relation of P;
(ii) if P is complete, xPy and D(y) D(x) together implies B(x) B(y).
Proof. (i) Let x;y;z 2 X . Assume xPcy and yPcz. For any t 2 X , if tPx, then
tPy indicating tPz; and if zPt, then yPt implying xPt. Then xPz and xPcz.
(ii) If P is asymmetric and complete, then for any z 2 X with zPx, we
have zPy. Otherwise, yPz implies xPz. Contradiction. 
Because of the transitivity of Pc, the uncovered set is nonempty for every
abstract decision problem. Remark 2.3.1-(ii) makes sure that in the domain
of tournaments, the uncovered set defined here coincides with the solution
of uncovered set formulated in [38] and its equivalence in [22].
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The uncovered set solution was further developed by [14], [36], [41] and
[58] for abstract decision problems where P is complete but not necessarily
asymmetric and X is infinite. As for the variations of uncovered set, see [19]
for an excellent analysis and exposition. The uncovered set was also used as
a prediction set in the studies of spatial voting model in [58] and [21]. With
regards to the capability of this predictor for spatial voting games, see [8] and
[37] for the excellent experimental exploration and theoretical expositions
respectively. Here we are mainly concerned with abstract decision problems
whose dominance relations are asymmetric but not necessarily complete.
2.3.1 The properties of uncovered set
Theorem 2.3.1 The solution of uncovered set is a-monotonic.
The above conclusion follows from the obvious fact that any uncovered
alternative is still uncovered by enlarging its dominion set without expending
its dominator set. However, the uncovered set solution satisfies neither b -
monotonicity nor g-monotonicity. To see this point, consider the following
counterexample.
Example 2.3.2 Consider (X ;P) in the left side of Figure 2.4. The covering
relation Pc is expressed in the right side of Figure 2.4. Then we have,
UC(X ;P) = fx1;x2;x3;x5g:
Take (X ;P0) described in Figure 2.5 (the left one) where P0= P except x3P0x5.
The covering relation P0c is represented in Figure 2.5 (the right one). Thus,
UC(X ;P0) = fx1;x2;x3;x4;x5g:
Clearly, in spite of the fact that x3’s dominion is enlarged by revering the
dominance relation between x3 and x5, x3 fails to exclude the acceptance of
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Fig. 2.4 (X ;P) and (X ;Pc).
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Fig. 2.5 (X ;P0) and (X ;P0c).
2.3 The theory of uncovered set 41
x5. Thus, the uncovered set solution does not satisfy b -monotonicity. Cer-
tainly, it does not satisfy g-monotonicity as well.
Theorem 2.3.2 (Miller 1980) Let (X ;P) 2T (X). Then
x 2UC(X ;P) i f and only i f either xPy or xPz and zPy where z 2 X
for any y 2 X.
Proof. Let x 2UC(X ;P), y 2 X be different from x and yPx. If for any z 2 X
with xPz, we have yPz, then yPcx. Contradiction. Thus, there exists a z 2 X
such that xPz but zPy.
Conversely, suppose x =2UC(X ;P). There exists a y 2 X such that yPcx
implying that yPx and for any z 2 X if xPz then yPz. Contradiction. 
The above theorem says that if an abstract decision problem is a tourna-
ment, the uncovered set is made up of alternatives which could dominate any
other alternative by a dominance chain which is no longer than two (called
Two Step Principle in [58]). This conclusion may not hold when dominance
relation is incomplete. To see this, consider the next example.
Example 2.3.3 Consider (X ;P) in Figure 2.6. We get UC(X ;P) = X. But,
x1 cannot dominate x5 by any dominance chain of length one or two.
Theorem 2.3.3 (Moulin 1986) The uncovered set is the smallest solutionS
(with respect to inclusion) that satisfies:
Neutrality: For any (X ;P) 2T (X),S (X ;Ps ) = s [S (X ;P)];
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: Let (X ;P);(X ;P0) 2 T (X) and
T  X. If (T;PT ) = (T;P0T ), thenS (T;PT ) =S (T;P0T );
Expansion: For any (X ;P) 2T (X) and T1;T2  X,
S (T1;PT1)\S (T2;PT2)S (T1[T2;PT1[T2):
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Proof. The proof was given in [39, p278]. 
Neutrality says that a solution should not discriminate among alterna-
tives. This is a requirement for a solution which does not cause much con-
troversies usually. The independence of irrelevant alternatives expresses that
the choice(s) from a subset must only depend on the restriction of the domi-
nance relation to this subset. The property of expansion requires that when
we choose over T1 and T2 separately, the intersection of these two choice sets
should be included in the choice set of the conjunction of T1 and T2.
The conclusion presented in Theorem 2.3.3 rests on essentially the as-
sumption of the completeness of dominance relation. Generally, it does not
hold any more if dominance relation is incomplete. For instance, it is easy to
verify that the solution of admissible set satisfies Neutrality, Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives and Expansion. However, the uncovered set may
not be contained in the admissible set, as we will show in the following sub-
section.
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2.3.2 The relations with other solutions
In this subsection, we explore the relation of uncovered set with the maximal
alternative set and the admissible set. Moreover, we make a comparison
between the notions of uncovered set and of stable set.
Theorem 2.3.4 For any (X ;P) 2W(X), m(X ;P)UC(X ;P).
Proof. Let x 2 m(X ;P). Suppose x =2UC(X ;P). Then there exists a y 2 X
such that yPcx. In this case, we have yPx, which contradicts x 2 m(X ;P). 
Given an alternative x in the uncovered set, there may exists a y in this
set such that yPx. Therefore, UC(X ;R)  m(X ;P) does not hold in general.
Thus, the uncovered set may be treated as an extension of the maximal al-
ternative set. Note that, the maximal alternative set may be empty while the
uncovered set is always nonempty.
Theorem 2.3.5 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). Then
(i) for any x;y 2UC(X ;P), not xPcy;
(ii) for any y 2 X nUC(X ;P), there exists an x 2UC(X ;P) such that xPcy.
Proof. According to Definition 2.3.1, we have UC(X ;P) = m(X ;Pc). Since
Pc is transitive, this conclusion follows directly from Theorem 1.3.5-(ii). 
The above result expresses that the uncovered set is a stable set defined
with regards to Pc. Based on this point, we may regard the uncovered set as
a variant of stable set as well. The solution of stable set may not exist but the
uncovered set always exists. For this reason, it is fair to say that the theory
of uncovered set improves the theory of stable sets. In general, an alternative
in the uncovered set may be dominated by another one in the same set. That
means, the uncovered set solution violates inner consistency. By contrast,
the solution of stable set preserves this consistency.
Theorem 2.3.5 ensures that for any y outside the uncovered set, there is
an x in the uncovered set with xPy. Thus, the uncovered set and stable set
both are provided with the property of external stability. Another common
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feature is that both solutions do not prevent a chosen alternative from being
dominated by some unchosen alternative. For instance, reconsider (X ;P) in
Figure 2.4 whereby x4 is outside the uncovered set but dominates x3 which
is in the uncovered set.
Theorem 2.3.6 Let (X ;P) 2W(X) with S(X ;P) 6= /0. Then
UC(X ;P)\V 6= /0 f or any V 2 S(X ;P):
Proof. Suppose there is aV 2 S(X ;P)withUC(X ;P)\V = /0. For any x2V ,
there exists a y 2 X such that yPcx implying yPx, which implies y =2V . Then
there is a z 2V with zPy. As yPcx, zPx which contradicts x;z 2V . 
The above result shows the fact that a stable set always contains some
uncovered alternative(s).
Theorem 2.3.7 (Miller 1980) Let (X ;P) 2T (X). UC(X ;P) AD(X ;P).
Proof. Let x 2UC(X ;P) and y 2 X with yPtx. By Theorem 2.3.2, either xPy
or there exists a z 2 X such that xPz and zPy. Thus, xPty which indicates
x 2 AD(X ;P). 
Example 2.3.1 shows that the uncovered set may be strictly contained
in the admissible set. Thus, the solution of uncovered set is a refinement
of the admissible set in the domain of tournaments. Note that, the conclu-
sion in Theorem 2.3.7 does not hold generally when dominance relation is
incomplete. To see this, consider the following example.
Example 2.3.4 Reconsider (X ;P) in Figure 1.1 where P is incomplete. Ac-
cording to Theorem 2.2.3, we have
AD(X ;P) = X nfx5;x9;x10;x11g:
Due to x3Px4, B(x3) = fx2g  B(x4) = fx2;x3g and D(x4) = fx1g D(x3) =
fx1;x4;x5g, we get that x4 is covered by x3, and that x is uncovered for any
x 2 X nfx4g. Thus, UC(X ;P) = X nfx4g* AD(X ;P):
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It has been shown by [38] that every alternative in the uncovered set is
Pareto optimal whenever dominance relation is derived from pairwise major-
ity comparison. That is because that for any x;y 2 X , if x is unanimously
preferred to y, x not only dominates y but also covers y. In contrast, the
admissible set solution does not possess this property.
2.3.3 Concluding remark
The uncovered set performs better than the admissible set in the following
respect: First, given a tournament, the uncovered set refines the admissible
set. That means, it has more discriminatory power than the admissible set
in the domain of tournaments. Second, the uncovered set precludes the p-
resence of Pareto suboptimal alternative if dominance relation is deduced
from pairwise majority comparison whereas the admissible set may contain
some Pareto suboptimal alternative(s). As showed in Example 2.3.4, the un-
covered set might be less decisive than the admissible set when dominance
relation is incomplete.
Actually, the discriminating power of the uncovered set may disappear
in the following sense: Given an abstract decision problem, no matter its
dominance relation is complete or incomplete, the uncovered set solution is
likely to select all the alternatives under consideration. To see this, reconsider
(X ;P0) in Figure 2.5 which is a tournament. As d(x3) = 3 and d(x4) = 1,
P0 is irregular. In spite of this fact, UC(X ;P0) chooses every alternative in
X . Reconsider (X ;P) in Figure 2.6. The dominance relation in this case
is both incomplete and irregular. However, the uncovered set is the same
as the whole alternative set. Hence, it still makes sense to seek out a more
decisive solution than the uncovered set. To achieve this purpose, we turn
our attention to two refinements of the uncovered set in the next chapter.

Chapter 3
Two Refinements of the
Uncovered Set
3.1 Introduction
As we showed in the last chapter, the uncovered set refines the admissible set
in the domain of tournaments. However, this solution still may include every
alternative under consideration even if dominance relation P is irregular and
complete. This indicates that the uncovered set is not a decisive solution
for abstract decision problems in general. There are several noted solutions
in the literature which could be treated as refinements of the uncovered set
in the domain of tournaments. These are the Banks set in [6], the minimal
covering set in [20], the tournament equilibrium set in [54] and the Copeland
winner set in [13]. It can be shown that none of the Bank set, the minimal
covering set and the tournament equilibrium set is a dominated subset of the
uncovered set. Regrettably, given a tournament with irregular dominance
relation, all of them except the Copeland winner set may also choose all
the alternatives under consideration. That means, these three refinements
fail to remove the weakness of the uncovered set in discriminating among
alternatives.
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In contrast, it can be proved that the Copeland winner set is always a
proper subset of X as long as P is irregular and complete. As we will show,
one disadvantage of the Copeland winner set is that it might be a dominated
subset of the uncovered set in the sense that every alternative in the Copeland
winner set is dominated by any other alternative inside the uncovered set
but outside the Copeland winner set. Furthermore, the Copeland winner set
may preclude all the maximal alternatives. Thus, it is still worth exploring
a new solution with more discriminatory power than the uncovered set. It
is expected that this new solution is able to overcome the drawbacks of the
Copeland winner set. With this motivation, we put forward a new solution
which is called unsurpassed set. It will be shown that the unsurpassed set
is nested between the solutions of uncovered set and of Copeland winner
set. More importantly, the unsurpassed set solution could accommodate the
mentioned weaknesses of the uncovered set and that of the Copeland winner
set. We also will investigates how an selected alternative varies and changes
other alternatives when its dominion is reinforced, and make a comparison
with the solutions of uncovered set and of Copeland winner set in this respect.
Furthermore, we will also discuss its relations with the solutions of maximal
alternative set, of stable set and of admissible set.
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we
discuss the Copeland winner set solution which was originally introduced in
[13] for dominance relations that are derived from pairwise majority com-
parison. Here, we generalize this concept in such a way that no restriction
is imposed on the formulation of P. In addition to the works of [51] and of
[39], we investigate its relations with other solutions discussed in the previ-
ous chapters. Section 3.3 is dedicated to the theory of unsurpassed set that
is mainly based on [26]. We first investigate how the unsurpassed set varies
with the changes in dominance relation, and then show in which way the un-
surpassed set makes up the disadvantages of uncovered set and of Copeland
winner set. Moreover, we compare this solution with the maximal alterna-
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tive set, the admissible set and stable set solution. Finally, in Section 3.4, we
offer an application case to show the working of our theory.
3.2 The theory of Copeland winner set
To pick out more reasonable alternatives from X , one frequently used ap-
proach is to assign each alternative with a number which may stand for its
superiority in the perspective of dominance position. Then choose the al-
ternatives with the biggest number. The solution of Copeland winner set is
precisely based on this idea. Recall that the Copeland score of an alternative
x in (X ;P) (see Section 1.2.1), denoted by cs(x), is the difference between
the number of alternatives that it dominates and the number of alternatives
that are dominated by x. A Copeland winner in (X ;P) is the alternative with
the greatest Copeland score.
The notion of Copeland winner set was originally proposed by [13] for
pairwise majority comparison relation (See [22] and [30] for more detail-
s). As this notion is well-defined in the domain of W(X), we generalize
this concept to cover broader class of decision problems. Here, we reformu-
late its original definition to facilitate the comparison between the notion of
Copeland winner set and that of the uncovered set.
Definition 3.2.1 Let (X ;P) 2 W(X). The Copeland winner set of (X ;P) is
defined as:
CW (X ;P) = fx 2 X j y co-dominates x for no y 2 Xg:
where y co-dominates x, denoted by yPcox, if cs(y)> cs(x).
Clearly, the Copeland winner set selects alternatives which are maximal
with respect to Pco. That is, CW (X ;P) = m(X ;Pco). Due to this fact, we
classify the Copeland winner set as a variant of the maximal alternative set.
Because of the transitivity of Pco, the Copeland winner set is nonempty for
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Fig. 3.1 (X ;Pco)
every abstract decision problem. Generally, given x;y 2 X , neither xPcoy
implies xPy nor xPy implies xPcoy. That means, Pco is neither a sub-relation
of P nor a super-relation of P.
Example 3.2.1 Reconsider (X ;P) in Figure 2.6. We have
cs(xi) = 0 f or any xi 2 fx1;x2;x5;x6g;
cs(x3) = 1 and cs(x4) = 1:
Pco is expressed in Figure 3.1. Then
CW (X ;P) = fx4g whereas UC(X ;P) = X :
In spite of x3Px4, we have x4Pcox3.
Remark 3.2.1 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). If P is transitive, P Pco.
Proof. Let x;y 2 X with xPy. If P is transitive, then zPx implies zPy for any
z 2 X and yPk implies xPk for any k 2 X . Thus we have cs(x) > cs(y) that
implies xPcoy. 
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3.2.1 The properties of Copeland winner set
Theorem 3.2.1 (Henriet 1985) The Copeland winner set is the unique solu-
tion that satisfies
Neutrality: For any (X ;P) 2W(X),S (X ;Ps ) = s [S (X ;P)];
g-monotonicity Let (X ;P) 2W(X) and x 2S (X ;P). If P0 = P except xP0y
where y 2 X, thenS (X ;P0) = fxg
Independence of cycles: For any (X ;P)2W(X),S (X ;P0) =S (X ;P) if P0
is obtained by reversing a dominance cycle of P.
Proof. See the proof in [27, p54-p56]. 
The requirement of independence of cycles shows that the choice set is
invariant to reverse a dominance cycle of P.
Corollary 3.2.1 The solution of Copeland winner set is both a-monotonic
and b -monotonic.
Proof. This result follows from Lemma 1.2.1 and Theorem 3.2.1. 
The above theorem shows that the solution of Copeland winner set is
more sensitive to the enhancement of selected alternative’s dominion than
the solution of the uncovered set which satisfies neither a-monotonicity nor
b -monotonicity.
Theorem 3.2.2 Let (X ;P) 2T (X). Then
CW (X ;P) is a proper subset o f X i f and only i f P is irregular:
Proof. If P is irregular and complete, there are x;y 2 X such that d(x) 6=
d(y). Without loss of generality, we assume d(x) > d(y) implying b(x) <
b(y). Then cs(x) > cs(y) and xPcoy. Thus, y =2 CW (X ;P), which implies
CW (X ;P)( X .
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Conversely, let CW (X ;P) be a proper subset of X . If P is regular, then
for any x;y 2 X , d(x) = d(y) and b(x) = b(y) implying cs(x) = cs(y). Thus
CW (X ;P) = X . Contradiction. 
It is necessary to be aware of the fact that the result presented in Theorem
3.2.2 may not be true when dominance relation is incomplete. To clarify this,
see the following counterexample.
Example 3.2.2 Consider (X ;P) in Figure 3.2. As neither x1Px4 nor x4Px1,
P is incomplete. We have
d(xi) = b(xi) = 1 f or any xi 2 fx1;x3;x5g;
d(x j) = b(x j) = 2 f or any x j 2 fx2;x4;x6g:
Clearly, P is irregular. As cs(x) = 0 for any x 2 X, we get CW (X ;P) = X.
3.2.2 The relations with other solutions
In this subsection, we investigate the relations between the Copeland winner
set and other solutions proposed in the previous chapters.
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Remark 3.2.2 There exists (X ;P) 2W(X) such that
(i) CW (X ;P)\m(X ;P) = /0;
(ii) CW (X ;P)\V = /0 where V 2 S(X ;P);
(iii) CW (X ;P)\AD(X ;P) = /0.
The above remark shows that the Copeland winner set may consist of
alternatives which are contained neither in the maximal alternative set, nor
in the admissible set, nor in any stable set. More specifically, Remark 3.2.2-
(i) shows that the Copeland winner set is not core-inclusive. Thus it cannot
be considered as an extension of the maximal alternative set. In this respect,
it differs fundamentally from the solutions of stable set, of admissible set
and of uncovered set which are core-inclusive. Remark 3.2.2-(ii) implies
that the Copeland winner set may be instable in the sense that no alternative
in this set is selected by any stable set. That also indicates the fact that every
alternative inside the Copeland winner set is likely to be instable. Remark
3.2.2-(iii) indicates that in general, the Copeland winner set cannot prevent
an alternative inside it from being dominated by alternatives outside it. To
confirm these points, consider the following example.
Example 3.2.3 Consider (X ;P) in Figure 3.3. We get
cs(x1) = 0; cs(x2) = 1; cs(x3) = 1;
cs(x4) = 0; cs(x5) = 1; cs(x6) = 1;
cs(x7) = 2; cs(x8) = 2; cs(x9) = 2;
Thus, CW (X ;P) = fx8g. In contrast,
m(X ;P) = fx3g; S(X ;P) = ffx1;x3;x5;x7;x9gg;
AD(X ;P) = fx1;x2;x3;x4;x5g:
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Theorem 3.2.3 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). Then
(i) for any x;y 2CW (X ;P), not xPcoy;
(ii) for any y 2 X nCW (X ;P), there exists an x 2CW (X ;P) such that xPcoy.
Proof. As Pco is transitive, this result follows from Theorem 1.3.5-(ii). 
This theorem expresses the fact that the Copeland winner set is a stable
set defined with respect to co-dominance relation. Therefore, the Copeland
winner set could also be regarded as a variation of stable set solution. One
thing that needs to be emphasized is that the Copeland winner set satisfies
neither internal stability nor external stability in general. To confirm this,
consider the following example.
Example 3.2.4 Consider (X ;P) in Figure 3.4. We have that
cs(x1) = cs(x2) = 1;
cs(x3) = 2; cs(x4) = cs(x5) = 0;
Thus, CW (X ;P) = fx1;x2g. However, x1Px2 and neither x1Px4 nor x2Px4.
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Theorem 3.2.4 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). CW (X ;P)UC(X ;P).
Proof. Let x 2 CW (X ;P). Suppose x =2UC(X ;P). Then there exists a y 2
UC(X ;P)with yPcx which implies yPx, B(y) B(x) and D(x)D(y). Thus,
we have d(y) b(y)> d(x) b(x) indicating yPcox. Contradiction. 
As we showed in Example 3.2.1, the Copeland winner set may be strictly
included in the uncovered set. Thus, the Copeland winner set is a refinement
of the uncovered set. Theorem 3.2.4 makes sure that every alternative in the
Copeland winner set is Pareto optimal when dominance relation is derived
from pairwise majority comparison.
Lemma 3.2.1 Let (X ;P) 2W(X) and Y  X. If Y \AD(X ;P) 6= /0, then Y is
not a dominated subset of X.
Proof. Let Y \AD(X ;P) 6= /0. Suppose Y is a dominated subset of X . Then
xPy for any x 2 X nY and y 2 Y , which implies that not yPtx. Take t 2
Y \AD(X ;P) and x 2 X nY . Then xPt but not tPtx, which contradicts t 2
AD(X ;P). 
Let AD[UC(X ;P)] be the admissible set of the restriction of (X ;P) to its
own uncovered setUC(X ;P).
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Theorem 3.2.5 (Moulin 1986) Let (X ;P) 2T (X). Then
CW (X ;P)\AD[UC(X ;P)] 6= /0 i f jX j  12:
Proof. See the proof in [39, p281]. 
The above theorem shows that given a tournament (X ;P), as long as the
cardinality of X is less than thirteen, the Copeland winner set always picks
an alternative from the admissible set of the restriction of (X ;P) toUC(X ;P).
In this case, Lemma 3.2.1 ensures that the Copeland winner set will never be
a dominated subset of the uncovered set.
However, the disadvantage of Copeland winner set may arise when a
tournament contains more than twelve alternatives, as explicitly pointed out
in [39]. That is, the Copeland winner set might be a dominated subset of
the uncovered set. In order to clarify this, we represent the counterexample
offered in [39, p280] (see Figure 3.5).
Example 3.2.5 Consider the tournament (X ;P) in Figure 3.5. Every non-
depicted dominance relation in P goes from upward to downward. Then
B(x1) = fx3;x8;x9;x10g; D(x1) = fx2;x4;x5;x6;x7;x11;x12;x13g;
B(x2) = fx1;x5;x6;x7g; D(x2) = fx3;x4;x8;x9;x10;x11;x12;x13g;
B(x3) = fx2;x11;x12;x13g; D(x3) = fx1;x4;x5;x6;x7;x8;x9;x10g;
B(x4) = fx1;x2;x3g; D(x4) = fx5;x6;x7;x8;x9;x10;x11;x12;x13g;
B(x5) = fx1;x3;x4;x7;x8;x9;x10g; D(x5) = fx2;x6;x11;x12;x13g;
B(x6) = fx1;x3;x4;x5;x8;x9;x10g; D(x6) = fx2;x7;x11;x12;x13g;
B(x7) = fx1;x3;x4;x6;x8;x9;x10g; D(x7) = fx2;x5;x11;x12;x13g;
B(x8) = fx2;x3;x4;x10;x11;x12;x13g; D(x8) = fx1;x5;x6;x7;x9g;
B(x9) = fx2;x3;x4;x8;x11;x12;x13g; D(x9) = fx1;x5;x6;x7;x10g;
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B(x10) = fx2;x3;x4;x9;x11;x12;x13g; D(x10) = fx1;x5;x6;x7;x8g;
B(x11) = fx1;x2;x4;x5;x6;x7;x13g; D(x11) = fx3;x8;x9;x10;x12g;
B(x12) = fx1;x2;x4;x5;x6;x7;x11g; D(x12) = fx3;x8;x9;x10;x13g;
B(x13) = fx1;x2;x4;x5;x6;x7;x12g; D(x13) = fx3;x8;x9;x10;x11g:
Then, we get Pc : x1Pcx5, x1Pcx6, x1Pcx7,x2Pcx11,x2Pcx12,
x2Pcx13; x3Pcx8; x3Pcx9; x3Pcx10:
cs(xi) = d(xi) b(xi) =
8><>:
4 if i= 1;2;3;
6 if i= 4;
 2 if i= 5; : : : ;13:
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Thus, we get
UC(X ;P) = fx1;x2;x3;x4g and CW (X ;P) = fx4g:
Clearly, xiPx4 for any xi 2 fx1;x2;x3g, which indicates CW (X ;P) is a domi-
nated subset of UC(X ;P).
In view of the above fact, it is still meaningful to formulate an alternative
refinement of the uncovered set which overcomes this disadvantage of the
Copeland winner set.
3.2.3 Concluding remark
In this section, we discussed the solution of Copeland winner set and repre-
sent one of its characterization. This solution is contained in the uncovered
set. Moreover, if P is irregular and complete, this solution is a proper subset
of X while the uncovered set may coincide with X . These results demon-
strate that the Copeland winner set is more decisive than the uncovered set.
However, this solution has some unpleasant properties elsewhere. Firstly, as
a variation of the maximal alternative set, it is not core-inclusive. In contrast,
both the solutions of stable set, of admissible set and of uncovered set are
core-inclusive. Secondly, given an abstract decision problem, an alternative
belonging to the Copeland winner set V might be dominated by both some
alternative inside V and an alternative outside V . Thirdly, this solution may
lose its discriminatory power in front of dominance relations that are incom-
plete but irregular, as we showed in Example 3.2.2. Finally, as a refinement
of the uncovered set, it might be a dominated subset of the uncovered set.
3.3 The theory of unsurpassed set
The solution of uncovered set chooses the alternatives which are maximal in
terms of the covering relation while the Copeland winner set solution selects
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alternatives which are maximal with respect to the co-dominance relation.
Both solutions are nonempty for every abstract decision problem. However,
the covering relation is so strict in the sense that the uncovered set defined
by it may not discriminate among alternatives even in front of an abstract
decision problem whose dominance relation is irregular and complete. As
a comparison, the co-dominance relation is so weak such that the Copeland
winner set defined by it may exclude all maximal alternatives. Moreover, the
Copeland winner set might be a dominated subset of the uncovered set. For
these reasons, we put forward a moderate binary relation, called surpassing
relation, which lies in between the covering relation and the co-dominance
relation. By using this new binary relation, we formulate the solution of
unsurpassed set.
Definition 3.3.1 Let (X ;P) 2 W(X). For any x;y 2 X, say x surpasses y,
denoted by xPsy, if (i) xPy; (ii) b(x)  b(y); (iii) d(x)  d(y) where either
(ii) or (iii) is a strict inequality.
The above notion expresses that x surpasses y if not only x dominates
y but also x has no more dominators than that of y and x’s dominion is no
smaller than that of y. Furthermore, either x is less dominated than y or x
dominates more than y.
Theorem 3.3.1 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). Then
(i) Ps is acyclic sub-relation of P ;
(ii) Pc  Ps  Pco:
Proof. (i) For any x;y 2 X , xPsy implies xPy. Thus Ps is a sub-relation of
P. Suppose there are x1, x2, : : :, xk 2 X such that x1Psx2 and x2Psx3, : : :,
xk 1Psxk, xkPsx1. Then, b(x1)  b(x2), b(x2)  b(x3),: : :, b(xk 1)  b(xk)
and d(x1) d(x2), d(x2) d(x3),: : :, d(xk 1) d(xk) where either b(xk)>
b(x1) or d(x1)> d(xk), which contradicts xkPsx1. Thus Ps is acyclic.
(ii) Let x;y2X . If xPcy, then xPy, B(x)B(y) andD(y)D(x) implying
b(x)< b(y) and d(x)> d(y). Thus, xPsy. Then b(x) b(y), d(x) d(y) and
b(y) b(x)+d(x) d(y)> 0 implies cs(x)> cs(y). Thus xPcoy. 
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Note that Pc and Ps both are sub-relations of P while this is not true for
Pco generally. Theorem 3.3.1-(ii) shows that surpassing relation is a more
demanding binary relation than dominance relation but a less demanding
binary relation than covering relation.
Definition 3.3.2 Let (X ;P)2W(X). The unsurpassed set of (X ;P) is defined
as:
US(X ;P) = fx 2 X j yPsx f or no y 2 Xg
The above definition says that the unsurpassed set selects alternatives
which are maximal with respect to Ps. That isUS(X ;P) = m(X ;Ps). Because
of the acyclicity of Ps, the unsurpassed set is nonempty for every abstract
decision problem.
Example 3.3.1 Consider (X ;P) in Figure 3.6 (the left one). We have
B(x1) = fx5;x6g; D(x1) = fx2;x3g; b(x1) = d(x1) = 2; cs(x1) = 0;
B(x2) = fx1g; D(x2) = fx3;x4g; b(x2) = 1; d(x2) = 2; cs(x2) = 1;
B(x3) = fx1;x2;x3g; D(x2) = fx4g; b(x3) = 3; d(x3) = 1; cs(x3) = 2;
B(x4) = fx2;x3g; D(x4) = fx5g; b(x4) = 2; d(x4) = 1; cs(x4) = 1;
B(x5) = fx4;x6g; D(x5) = fx1g; b(x5) = 2; d(x5) = 1; cs(x5) = 1;
B(x6) = /0; D(x6) = fx1;x3;x5g; b(x6) = 0; d(x6) = 3; cs(x6) = 3;
Pc is presented in Figure 3.6 (the right one), Pco and Ps are respectively
expressed in Figure 3.7. Thus, we have that
UC(X ;P) = fx1;x2;x4;x6g;
CW (X ;P) = fx6g but US(X ;P) = fx2;x6g:
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3.3.1 The properties of unsurpassed set
Theorem 3.3.2 (i) The solution of unsurpassed set is a-monotonic.
(ii) The solution of unsurpassed set is b -monotonic in the domain of tourna-
ments.
Proof. (i) Take x 2US(X ;P) and P0 = P except xP0y where y 2 X . Then
b(X ;P0)(x) b(X ;P)(x) and d(X ;P0)(x) d(X ;P)(x):
If x =2US(X ;P0), there exists a z2 X with zP0sx implying zP0x and zPx. Thus,
d(X ;P0)(z) d(X ;P0)(x); b(X ;P0)(z) b(X ;P0)(x) and cs(X ;P0)(z)> cs(X ;P0)(x):
Because of b(X ;P)(z) = b(X ;P0)(z) and d(X ;P)(z) = d(X ;P0)(z), we have zPsx,
which contradicts x 2US(X ;P).
(ii) Let (X ;P) 2 T (X), x 2US(X ;P) and y 2 X with yPx. As P is com-
plete, we get
b(X ;P)(z) = jX j d(X ;P)(z) 1 f or any z 2 X :
Because of x2US(X ;P), we have d(X ;P)(y)< d(X ;P)(x) implying b(X ;P)(x)<
b(X ;P)(y). Take P0 = P except xP0y. Then
d(X ;P0)(x) = d(X ;P)(x)+1 and d(X ;P0)(y) = d(X ;P)(y) 1;
b(X ;P0)(x) = b(X ;P)(x) 1 and b(X ;P0)(y) = b(X ;P)(y)+1:
Thus, d(X ;P0)(x) > d(X ;P0)(y) and b(X ;P0)(x) < b(X ;P0)(y). That indicate that
xP0sy and y =2US(X ;P0). 
In general, the unsurpassed set solution is neither b -monotonic nor g-
monotonic. Even in the domain of tournaments, the solution of unsurpassed
set is not g-monotonic. To clarify this, see the following example.
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Example 3.3.2 Reconsider (X ;P) in Figure 3.6. Take (X ;P0) where P0 = P
except x2P0x6. We get P0s = Ps. Thus, US(X ;P0) = fx2;x6g: Despite that x2’s
dominion is enlarged in (X ;P0), x2 does not exclude the acceptance of x6.
Reconsider (X ;P) in Figure 3.5 which is a tournament. Take (X ;P0)
where P0 = P except x4P0x3. It can be verified that US(X ;P0) = fx1;x2;x4g:
Despite that x4’s dominion is enlarged in (X ;P0), x4 is not the unique selected
alternative.
Theorem 3.3.3 Let (X ;P) 2T (X). Then
US(X ;P) = X if and only if P is regular:
Proof. If P is regular, then b(x) = b(y) and d(x) = d(y) for any x;y 2 X .
Then, x is unsurpassed for any x 2 X andUS(X ;P) = X .
Conversely, assume that P is irregular. Take X1 as follows
X1 = fx 2 X jd(x) d(y) f or any y 2 Xg:
As P irregular, both X1 and X nX1 are nonempty. Because P is complete, for
any x2X1 and y2X nX1, d(x)< d(y) and b(x)> b(y). Due toUS(X ;P)=X ,
for any x 2 X1 and y 2 X nX1, not yPsx but xPy, which implies d(x) > d(y).
Contradiction. 
The above theorem expresses the fact that the unsurpassed set is a proper
subset of alternative set as long as dominance relation is irregular and com-
plete. In general, the uncovered set solution does not have this property.
3.3.2 The relations with other solutions
The main objective of this subsection is to explore the relations between the
unsurpassed set and the solutions discussed in the previous sections.
Theorem 3.3.4 For any (X ;P) 2W(X), m(X ;P)US(X ;P).
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Proof. Let x 2 m(X ;P). If x =2 US(X ;P), there is a y 2 X such that yPsx
implying yPx, which contradicts x 2 m(X ;P). 
Since an x in the unsurpassed set V may be dominated by a y in V ,
UC(X ;R)  m(X ;P) does not hold in general. Thus, the solution of unsur-
passed set can be seen as an extension of the maximal alternative set.
Remark 3.3.1 There exists (X ;P) 2W(X) such that
V \US(X ;P) = /0 where V 2 S(X ;P):
The above remark says that given an abstract decision problem with
nonempty stable sets, the unsurpassed set may not contain any stable alter-
native. In contrast, the solution of uncovered set always comprises stable
alternative(s), as we have shown in Theorem 2.3.6. In general, an alternative
in the unsurpassed set may be dominated by another alternative in the same
set. To clarify these points, see the following example.
Example 3.3.3 Reconsider (X ;P) in Figure 3.6. Take P0 = P except x4P0x6.
We get S(X ;P0) = ffx1;x4gg and US(X ;P0) = fx2;x6g:
Reconsider (X ;P) in Figure 2.4. We have
Ps : x1Psx4; x5Psx2; x5Psx3 and x5Psx4:
Clearly, both x1 and x5 are unsurpassed but x1Px5.
As we have shown in Remark 3.2.2, the Copeland winner set does not
necessarily contain alternatives from the admissible set. But the solution of
unsurpassed set always selects some alternative (s) from the admissible set.
Remark 3.3.2 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). US(X ;P)\AD(X ;P) 6= /0.
Proof. Suppose US(X ;P)\AD(X ;P) = /0. Not xPy for any x 2 US(X ;P)
and y 2 AD(X ;P). As X is finite and Ps is acyclic, by Theorem 2.2.3, we get
US(X ;P) = AD(X ;Ps). For any x 2 AD(X ;P), there are x1;x2; : : : ;xm 2 X
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such that xm is unsurpassed and x1Psx, x2Psx1,: : :, xmPsxm 1 which implying
xmPtx. Then there are xi 2 X nAD(X ;P) and x j 2 AD(X ;P) with xiPsx j
implying xiPx j. Contradiction. 
Theorem 3.3.5 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). CW (X ;P)US(X ;P)UC(X ;P).
Proof. The proof follows from Theorem 3.3.1-(ii). 
As we showed in Example 3.3.1, the unsurpassed set can be a proper
subset of the uncovered set, and the Copeland winner set may be strictly
included in the unsurpassed set. Hence, the unsurpassed set is a refinement
of the uncovered set but an extension of the Copleland winner set.
Corollary 3.3.1 Let (X ;P) 2T (X). US(X ;P) AD(X ;P).
Proof. This result follows from Theorem 2.3.7 and Theorem 3.3.5. 
Note that neither the uncovered set, nor the unsurpassed set, nor the
Copeland winner set is contained in the admissible set generally. But all
of them refine the solution of admissible set in the domain of tournaments.
Theorem 3.3.6 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). US(X ;P)\AD[UC(X ;P)] 6= /0.
Proof. Suppose US(X ;P)\AD[UC(X ;P)] = /0. By Theorem 2.2.2, not yPx
for any x 2 AD[UC(X ;P)] and y 2UC(X ;P)nAD[UC(X ;P)]. Take an
xi 2 fsjs 2 argminfb(y) j y 2 argmaxfd(x) j x 2 AD[UC(X ;P)]ggg:
Since xi =2US(X ;P), there exists a yi 2 X with yiPsxi which implies
yiPxi and d(yi) d(xi); b(xi) b(yi) but cs(xi)< cs(yi):
Hence yi =2 AD[UC(X ;P)] and yi =2UC(X ;P). There is a zi 2UC(X ;P) such
that ziPcyi implying ziPxi and d(zi) > d(yi). Thus zi 2 AD[UC(X ;P)]. Due
to d(yi) d(xi), we get d(zi)> d(xi) which contradicts d(zi) d(xi). 
According to Lemma 3.2.1, we conclude that for any abstract decision
problem, the unsurpassed set never is a dominated subset of the uncovered
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set. As a comparison, the solution of Copeland winner set does not have this
property, as we have shown in Example 3.2.5.
3.3.3 Concluding remark
In this section, we introduced the notion of surpassing relation which is weak-
er than the covering relation but stricter than the co-dominance relation. By
using this notion, we formulated the unsurpassed set which is a refinement
of the uncovered set but an extension of the Copeland winner set. The theo-
ry of unsurpassed set always yields a proper subset of alternative set for all
irregular tournaments while this is not true for the theory of uncovered set.
Thus, the unsurpassed set is more decisive than the uncovered set. Moreover,
the unsurpassed set would never be a dominated subset of the uncovered set
while this is not true for the Copeland winner set. Furthermore, the unsur-
passed set is core-inclusive whereas the Copeland winner set is not. Based
on these points, we conclude that the unsurpassed set refines the uncovered
set in a more convincing way than the Copeland winner set. Besides, we al-
so showed that in the domain of tournaments, the unsurpassed set satisfies a
moderate monotonicity which is more demanding than a-monotonicity pos-
sessed by the uncovered set but less demanding than g-monotonicity fulfilled
by the Copeland winner set.
The theories of Copeland winner set and of unsurpassed set have sever-
al common advantages. First, both the Copeland winner set and the unsur-
passed set are nonempty for every abstract decision problem. That is, they
both solve the existence problem of solution. Second, both theories refine the
theory of uncovered set. The unsurpassed set and the Copeland winner set
both are strictly included in the set of alternatives X as long as the dominance
relation is complete and irregular. That is, both theories are decisive in the
domain of tournaments. However, these two theories also possess some com-
mon disadvantages. First of all, neither the unsurpassed set nor the Copeland
winner set has inner consistency. That is, an alternative in the Copeland win-
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ner set (or the unsurpassed set) might be dominated by another alternative in
the same set. Next, both theories allow alternatives in the solution to be dom-
inated by alternative outside the solution. Besides, both of them lose their
power to discriminate among alternatives in some cases whereby dominance
relations are incomplete but irregular. To deal with these cases, a new theory
that can accommodate these shortcomings is still needed.
3.4 Application in collective decision-making
It has been shown that the Copeland winner set and the unsurpassed set are
decisive solutions in the domain of tournaments. A natural question is raised:
does every tournament correspond to a possible decision situation? For this
question, a clear and firm answer was given in [35, p608] as follows:
Given an arbitrary preference pattern over a set of alternatives,
a group of individuals exists with strong individual preference
orderings such that the group preference pattern as determined
by the method of simple majority decision is the given preference
pattern.
In other words, given a (X ;P)2T (X), there always exists a set of preference
orderings figi2N such that
f or any x;y 2 X ; xPy i f and only i f xM y:
This conclusion ensures that the theories presented in this chapter can be
widely used to majority voting decision situations. To explain it more specif-
ically, we present a committee decision making case as follows:
A student committee N = f1;2;    ;15g must decide how to prioritize its
entertainment activities. A set of proposed events X = fx1;x2;x3;x4;x5;x6g is
to be planned. The committee member’s preference is listed in Table 3.1. The
constitution of this committee clearly stipulates that any collective decision
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Player Preference
1 x1  x4  x3  x2  x6  x5
2 x1  x5  x2  x6  x4  x3
3 x1  x6  x3  x5  x2  x4
4 x2  x5  x1  x4  x6  x3
5 x2  x6  x4  x1  x5  x3
6 x2  x4  x5  x3  x1  x6
7 x3  x1  x2  x4  x5  x6
9 x3  x2  x1  x6  x5  x4
8 x3  x2  x5  x1  x4  x6
10 x4  x6  x1  x5  x3  x2
11 x4  x3  x6  x2  x1  x5
12 x5  x3  x1  x4  x2  x6
13 x5  x6  x4  x2  x3  x1
14 x6  x3  x4  x1  x2  x5
15 x6  x5  x2  x3  x1  x4
Table 3.1 The Preference Profile on X
making could only be made by using simple majority rule. In this case, which
event(s) should be picked out as the collective choice(s) of this committee?
By making a pairwise majority comparison, we get the majority relation
M (N) that is presented in Figure 3.8. It can be checked that no alternative
in X is majority-preferred to any other event, and that neither the maximal
alternative set nor stable set exists in this case. Moreover, we have
x1M x6; x2M x1; x3M x2; x4M x3 x5M x4 and x6M x5;
That means, (X ;M ) is strongly connected. By Corollary 2.2.1, the admissi-
ble set does not discriminate among alternatives at all in this case.
The dominators and dominion of each alternative are listed as follows:
B(x1) = fx2; x3g; and D(x1) = fx4; x5; x6g;
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B(x2) = fx3g; and D(x2) = fx1; x4; x5; x6g;
B(x3) = fx4; x5; ; x6g and D(x3) = fx1; x2g;
B(x4) = fx1; x2; x5g and D(x4) = fx3; x6g;
B(x5) = fx1; x2; x6g and D(x5) = fx3; x4g;
B(x6) = fx1; x2; x4g and D(x6) = fx3; x5g:
The covering relation ofM isM c: x2M cx1. Thus we have
UC(X ;M ) = fx2;x3;x4;x5;x6g:
Clearly, x1 is the unique alternative that is covered. Thus, the uncovered set
is poorly discriminating and less decisive in this case. Next, we apply the
solutions of Copeland winner set and of unsurpassed set to this situation. It
is not difficult to verify that
b(x1) = 2; d(x1) = 3 and cs(x1) = 1;
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b(x2) = 1; d(x2) = 4 and cs(x2) = 3;
b(x3) = b(x4) = b(x5) = b(x6) = 3;
d(x3) = d(x4) = d(x5) = d(x6) = 2;
cs(x3) = cs(x4) = cs(x5) = cs(x6) = 1:
The co-dominance relationM co and the surpassing relationM s are present-
ed in Figure 3.9. Thus, we get that
CW (X ;M ) = fx2g while US(X ;M ) = fx2;x3g:
In this chapter, we have argued that the solution of unsurpassed set re-
fines the uncovered set solution in a more convincing way than the Copeland
winner set solution. Based on this argument, we believe that both x2 and x3
should be chosen as final collective choices.
Part II
Variations of Stable Set

Chapter 4
Two Weakened Theories of Stable
Set
4.1 Introduction
It has been shown that all the solutions discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3
follow the notion of maximality. This notion is closely related to rationality
(i,e., selecting the best) that belongs to the discipline of homo economicus.
The notion of stability formulated by [66] is, in our opinion, different. It is
closely related to standards of behavior in social organizations. In this chap-
ter, we explore two variations of this stability and investigate its relations
with maximal solutions studied in the precious chapters.
As we showed in Subsection 1.3.2, stable set solution may not exist in
some circumstances. To solve this existence problem, several variations of
stable set have been proposed in the literature which can be roughly divided
into two categories. In the first category, the focus is on defining a new
binary relation by extending or redefining the original dominance relation.
With this new relation, the notion of stable sets was revisited. That means,
these extensions of stable set are defined not based on the initial dominance
relation P, but on new binary relations derived from P. Examples are the
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admissible set in [29], generalized stable sets in [64] and extended stable
sets in [23]. The focus of the second category is on the reconstruction of
criteria of internal stability and of external stability. That is, these extensions
are obtained by using the reformulated notion of internal stability or external
stability. Examples are sub-solutions in [46], socially stable sets in [16] and
m-stable set in [43] and weakly stable set in [1] and [62].
In this chapter, we first discuss the solution of generalized stable sets
which was introduced in [64]. Following this work, we propose several new
characterizations for this solution which may give alternative perspectives on
generalized stable sets. We will also investigate the sensitivity of generalized
stable sets to the changes in the dominance relation and compare with stable
set solution in this respect. As the collection of generalized stable sets might
be large and some of generalized stable sets may contain Pareto suboptimal
alternative when dominance relation is derived from pairwise majority com-
parison, we refine this collection to exclude these ones that contain Pareto
suboptimal alternative(s).
The theory of generalized stable sets solves the existence problem of
stable sets successfully. However, this solution does not necessarily agree
with the solution of stable set even if dominance relation is acyclic (in this
case, stable set solution is non-empty and unique). For this reason, we will
introduce a new extension of stable sets called extended stable sets as a modi-
fication of generalized stable sets and formulate a characterization of extend-
ed stable sets by using the contraction technique. We will also discuss its
relation with stable sets and generalized stable sets. Because these three so-
lutions are defined in terms of the notions of internal stability and of external
stability under different binary relations, it is expected to compare their prop-
erties and to explore under which conditions these solutions coincide with
each other.
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2,
we study the theory of generalized stable sets. Apart from the work of [64],
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we present some new properties concerning this solution and propose a re-
finement for the collection of generalized stable sets. This section is mainly
based on the work of [24]. Section 4.3 is dedicated to the theory of extended
stable sets which is mainly based on the work of [23]. We characterize this
solution by using technique of contraction, and analysis its sensitivity to the
alternations in dominance relation. Moreover, we make a comparison with
other solutions. Finally, in Section 4.4, we present an application case to
show the working of our theories.
4.2 The theory of generalized stable sets
The notion of generalized stable sets was proposed in [64] as a variation of
stable set solution to solve the existence problem of stable sets.
Definition 4.2.1 Let (X ;P) 2 W(X). A set V is called a generalized stable
set of (X ;P) if it satisfies
(i) generalized internal stability: 8x;y 2V, not xPty;
(ii) generalized external stability: 8y 2 X nV, there is an x 2V with xPty.
LetGS(X ;P) be the collection of generalized stable sets for (X ;P). Clear-
ly, GS(X ;P) = S(X ;Pt). Generalized internal stability states that no alterna-
tive in a generalized stable set can upset another alternative in the same set by
a dominance chain. Since not xPty implies not xPy for any x;y 2V (not vice
versa), generalized internal stability is a more demanding constraint than in-
ternal stability. Generalized external stability shows that every alternative
outside a generalized stable set is dominated by another alternative inside
this set through a dominance chain. As xPy implies xPty for any x;y 2 V
(not vice versa), generalized external stability is a less demanding constraint
than external stability. Note that this condition does not exclude the situa-
tion that an alternative in a generalized stable set is dominated by another
alternative outside this set.
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Example 4.2.1 Consider (X ;P) in Figure 4.1. Pt is described in Figure 4.2.
Due to x1Px2, x2Px3 and x3Px1, no stable set exists for (X ;P). However,
GS(X ;P) = ffx1g;fx2g;fx3gg:
It is worth noting that Pt is not asymmetric in this case.
The notion of generalized stable sets could be similarly described as ac-
cepted standards of behavior as follows: As generalized internal stability
implies internal stability, generalized internal stability says that the standard-
s of behavior is free of inner contradictions: No alternative in a generalized
stable set is dominated by another alternative in the same set. Hence, all
the alternatives in generalized stable set are evenly matched. On the other
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hand, generalized external stability says that the standards of behavior may
discredit the non-conformable behaviors in an indirect way. That is, once an
alternative x outside a selected set V t-dominates an alternative y in V , then
x is in return certainly t-dominated by another alternative z inside V .
The following definition contributes to display the features of generalized
stable set. We will use it frequently in the sequel.
Definition 4.2.2 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). An alternative x 2V is said to be
(i) generalized stable in (X ;P) if there is a V 2 GS(X ;P) with x 2V;
(ii) generalized instable in (X ;P) if there is no V 2 GS(X ;P) with x 2V.
The remaining of this section is organized as follows. Subsection 4.2.1
focus on the properties of generalized stable sets. Inspired by the work in
[64], we make a further exploration to generalized stable set solution. Sub-
section 4.2.2 is devoted to comparing generalized stable set with other solu-
tions discussed in the previous chapters. In Subsection 4.2.3, we refine the
collection of generalized stable sets to exclude some undesirable ones.
4.2.1 The properties of generalized stable set
Theorem 4.2.1 (Van Deemen 1991) Let (X ;P) 2W(X) and V 2 GS(X ;V ).
(i) V is maximal in terms of set inclusion with respect to generalized internal
stability;
(ii) V is minimal in terms of set inclusion with respect to generalized external
stability.
Proof. The proof was given in [64, p258-259]. 
The above theorem shows that if V is a generalized stable set of (X ;P),
then neither its proper subset nor its proper superset is a generalized stable
set. Therefore, generalized stable set solution corresponds to a standards of
behavior which has an inner stability in the following sense: Once they gen-
erally accepted they overrule everything else through t-dominance relation
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and no part of them can be overruled by t-dominance relation within the
limits of the accepted standards.
Theorem 4.2.2 Let (X ;P) 2 W(X) and V  X. V 2 GS(X ;P) if and only if
V is cardinality minimal with respect to generalized external stability1.
Proof. LetV  X be cardinality minimal with respect to generalized external
stability. Suppose V does not satisfy generalized internal stability. Then
there exist x;y 2 V such that xPty. Because of the transitivity of Pt , xPtz
for any z 2 X nV with yPtz. Then V nfyg also satisfies generalized external
stability. Contradiction. Thus V 2 GS(X ;P).
Conversely, suppose there exist V 2 GS(X ;P) and W  X with jV j >
jW j such that both V and W satisfies generalized external stability. Take
T1 = V nW and T2 =W nV . Then jT1j > jT2j. (i) If jT2j = 0, then W is a
proper subset ofV . SinceW satisfies generalized external stability,V violates
generalized internal stability. Contradiction. (ii) If jT2j> 0, there are distinct
x1;y1 2 T1 and x2 2 T2 such that x2Ptx1, x2Pty1. Moreover, there exists a z1 2
T1 with z1Ptx2. By the transitivity of Pt , we have z1Ptx1 and z1Pty1. Then
V violates generalized internal stability, which contradicts V 2 GS(X ;P). 
The above theorem shows the notion of generalized stable sets corre-
sponds to an optimization conception. For instance, if alternatives are nodes,
and relation xPymeans that some object (water, for instance) allocated in x is
transferred from x to y, then generalized stable sets are minimal cardinality
sets in which the object must be allocated so that every node receives that
object.
Note that generalized stable set is not cardinality maximal with respec-
t to generalized internal stability in general. Take (X ;P) in Figure 1.3 for
1A solution S of (X ;P) is said to be (i) cardinality minimal with respect to general-
ized external stability if there does not exist any other solutionS 0 that satisfies generalized
external stability and jS 0(X ;P)j< jS (X ;P)j; (ii) cardinality maximalwith respect to gener-
alized internal stability if there does not exist any other solutionS 0 that satisfies generalized
internal stability and jS 0(X ;P)j> jS (X ;P)j.
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instance. GS(X ;P) = ffx1g;fx2g;fx3g;fx4gg while fx6;x7g satisfies gener-
alized internal stability. As a comparison, as we have shown in Section 1.3.2,
stable set is neither cardinality maximal with respect to internal stability nor
cardinality minimal with respect to external stability.
The following characterization of generalized stable sets was proposed
by [64] in terms of strong components.
Theorem 4.2.3 (Van Deemen 1991) Let (X ;P) 2 W(X) and m(X;Pcon) =
fX1 ;X2 ; : : : ;Xmg. Then
V 2 GS(X ;R) i f and only i f V = fx1;x2; : : : ;xmg
where xi 2 Xi and 1 i m.
Proof. The proof was given in [64, p258-259]. 
Theorem 4.2.3 shows that generalized stable set is made up of alterna-
tives that are selected from all maximal strong components and any two al-
ternatives lie in different strong components. Lemma 1.2.2 guarantees that
the maximal strong component set is nonempty for every abstract decision
problem. Thus, nonempty generalized stable sets always exist. The follow-
ing conclusions follow directly from Theorem 4.2.3.
Corollary 4.2.1 (Van Deemen 1991) Let (X ;P) 2W(X) and m(X;Pcon) =
fX1 ; jX2 j; : : : ;Xmg. Then
(1) jGS(X ;P)j= jX1 j jX2 j    jXmj;
(2) jV1j= jV2j for any V1;V2 2 GS(X ;P).
The next corollary expresses that the notion of generalized stable set coin-
cides with the notion of maximal alternative set as lone as dominance relation
is acyclic.
Corollary 4.2.2 Let (X ;P) 2 W(X). If P is acyclic, m(X ;P) is the unique
generalized stable set for (X ;P).
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Inspired by Theorem 4.2.3, we formulate an alternative characterization
of generalized stable sets as follows.
Theorem 4.2.4 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). Then
V 2 GS(X ;P) i f and only i f V =
[
1ik
Vi
where Vi 2 GS(Xi ;PXi ) and fX1 ;X2 ; : : : ;Xk g 2 GS(X;Pcon).
Proof. Since Pcon is acyclic, (X;Pcon) has a unique generalized stable set
which agrees with m(X;Pcon), by Corollary 4.2.2. For any Xi 2 X, either
Xi is a singleton set or PXi is a cycle containing all the alternatives in X

i .
According to Theorem 4.2.3, Vi 2 GS(Xi ;PXi ) if and only if jVij = 1. Then,
we get this conclusion. 
The above theorem expresses that generalized stable set solution is pro-
vided with the property of strong component consistency in the following
sense: generalized stable set selects generalized stable alternatives from gen-
eralized stable strong components. In general, stable set solution is not pro-
vided with this property. It is possible that a given stable alternative is not
contained in any stable strong component. For instance, reconsider (X ;P) in
Figure 1.4. We have fx1;x3g 2 S(X ;P) and S(X;Pcon) = fffx1ggg. How-
ever, x3 is not contained in any stable strong component.
Remark 4.2.1 Let (X ;P) 2W(X) and V 2 GS(X ;P).
(i) Take x 2 V. If P0 = P except xP0y where y 2 X, x is generalized stable in
(X ;P0);
(ii) Take x 2V and y2 X nV. If P0 = P except yP0z where z2 X, it is possible
that x is generalized instable in (X ;P0);
(iii) Take P0V[fzg = PV[fzg for any z 2 X. It is possible that V =2 GS(X ;P0).
Proof. (i) For any x 2 V , by Theorem 4.2.3, there is an Xi 2 m(X;Pcon)
such that x 2 Xi . Assume that (X ;P0) satisfies P0 = P except xPy where
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y 2 X . Then, there are no z 2 Xi and s 2 X nXi such that sP0z. Thus, Xi 2
m(X;P0con). Then, there is a V 0 2 GS(X ;P0) with x 2V 0.
Remark 4.2.1-(ii) and Remark 4.2.1-(iii) can be verified by the following
example. 
Example 4.2.2 Consider (X ;P) in Figure 4.3. We get
m(X;Pcon) = ffx1g;fx3;x4;x5gg:
According Theorem 4.2.3, we have
GS(X ;P) = ffx1;x3g;fx1;x4g;fx1;x5gg:
Take x4 2 fx1;x4g 2GS(X ;P) and (X ;P0) described in Figure 4.4. Obviously,
P0= P except x2P0x5. That is, P0 is derived from P by enlarging the dominion
of x2 which is generalized instable in (X ;P). However, we get
m(X;P0con) = ffx1gg and GS(X ;P0) = ffx1gg:
Clearly, x4 =2V 0 2 GS(X ;P0) and fx1;x4g =2 GS(X ;P0).
Remark 4.2.1 shows that given a generalized stable set V with an x 2 V ,
x is still generalized stable when extending x’s dominion and it might be
discredited into a generalized instable one by enlarging the dominion of some
y outside V . Moreover, generalized stable set solution is sensitive to the
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modification of dominance relation between alternatives outside this solution.
To compare, as we clarified in Remark 1.3.1, given a stable set W with an
x 2W , x might be changed into an instable one by extending its dominion,
but it is still a stable one under enlarging the dominion of any y outside W .
Furthermore,W is independent from the alternations of dominance relation
between alternatives outsideW .
4.2.2 The relations with other solutions
In this subsection, we focus on investigating the relations between general-
ized stable sets, and the maximal alternative set and the solutions presented
in Part I.
Theorem 4.2.5 (Van Deemen 1991) Let (X ;P) 2W(X). Then
(i) m(X ;R) =
T
V2GS(X ;R)V;
(ii) AD(X ;P) =
S
V2GS(X ;R)V.
Proof. The proof was given in [64, p258-259]. 
The above theorem implies an important fact that generalized stable set
solution not only is core-inclusive but also is included in the admissible set.
In contrast, both the uncovered set and the unsurpassed set are core-inclusive
but not necessarily contained in the admissible set; and the Copeland winner
set is neither core-inclusive nor included in the admissible set, as we have
shown in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
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There are two fundamental differences between the solutions of general-
ized stable set and of the admissible set. First, generalized stable sets pre-
serve internal stability but the admissible set violates this property. Second,
the admissible set is free from being dominated by alternative outside this
set while generalized stable sets are not.
Theorem 4.2.6 Let (X ;P) 2 W(X) and V 2 S(X ;R). There exists a W 2
GS(X ;P) with W V.
Proof. Let V 2 S(X ;R). It is sufficient to prove that V \Xi 6= /0 for any
Xi 2 m(X;Pcon). Suppose there is an Xi 2 m(X;Pcon) with Xi \V = /0.
Then for any y 2 Xi , there exists an x 2V with xPy . That means, there is an
Xj 2 X with x 2 Xj such that Xj PconXi . Contradiction. 
The above result says that every stable set includes a generalized stable
set. Conversely, not every generalized stable set is contained in some stable
set. To see this, consider the following example.
Example 4.2.3 Consider (X ;P) in Figure 4.5. We have
S(X ;P) = ffx1;x3gg and GS(X ;P) = ffx1g;fx2g;fx3g;fx4gg:
Take fx2g 2 GS(X ;P), then fx2g* fx1;x3g.
Theorem 4.2.7 For any (X ;P) 2 W(X), there exists a V 2 GS(X ;P) such
that V US(X ;P).
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Proof. Suppose there is no V 2 GS(X ;R) with V US(X ;P). By Theorem
4.2.3, there exists an Xi 2 m(X;Pcon) with Xi \US(X ;P) = /0. As both the
unsurpassed set and generalized stable set are core-inclusive, we get jXi j> 1.
Since Ps is acyclic, for any x 2 Xi , there exist x1;x2; : : : ;xm 2 X such that xm
is unsurpassed and x1Psx, x2Psx1,: : :, xmPsxm 1 which implies xmPtx. Then
there are xi 2 X nXi and x j 2 Xi such that xiPsx j indicating xiPx j, which
contradicts Xi 2 m(X;Pcon). 
It has been shown in Chapter 3 that the solution of unsurpassed set is
a refinements of the uncovered set solution. Hence, the next result can be
straightforwardly obtained.
Corollary 4.2.3 For any (X ;P) 2 W(X), there exists a V 2 GS(X ;R) such
that V UC(X ;P).
In Section 3.2 we have shown that in general the solution of Copeland
winner set is neither core-inclusive nor included within the admissible set.
Thus, the Copeland winner set may not contain any generalized stable set.
4.2.3 A refinement over generalized stable sets
According to Theorem 4.2.3 and Corollary 4.2.1, there may exist many gen-
eralized stable sets for a given abstract decision problem. Moreover, since
the union of generalized stable sets agrees with the admissible set, some
generalized stable set may contain Pareto suboptimal alternative when dom-
inance relation is deduced from pairwise majority comparison. Besides, as
we have shown in the last subsection, there always exists a generalized stable
set contained in the unsurpassed set for any abstract decision problem. That
indicates, within the collection of generalized stable sets, some generalized
stable sets behave better than others in discriminating among alternative. At
this point, it makes sense to narrow such collection and filter out more ap-
pealing ones.
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Actually, selecting special generalized stable set(s) will derive a new de-
cision problem, namely, to select a solution from a solution set. Thus, to
specify a binary relation over the solution set is necessary in this case.
Definition 4.2.3 Let (X ;P) 2 W(X). The refined generalized stable sets for
(X ;P) are defined as:
GSr(X ;P) = fV 2 GS(X ;P) j WDV f or no W 2 GS(X ;P)g
where WDV if there are x 2W and y 2V such that xPy and cs(x)> cs(y).
Clearly, the notion of refined generalized stable sets selects generalized
stable sets which are maximal with respect to D . It is important to point out
that the binary relation D is not asymmetric in general. Here we generalize
the notion of maximal alternative set to the case of not asymmetric binary
relation. To understand the above concept, consider the following example.
Example 4.2.4 Reconsider (X ;P) in Figure 1.1. We have
m(X;Pcon) = ffx1;x2;x3;x4g;fx6;x7;x8g;fx12gg:
By Corollary 4.2.1, jGS(X ;P)j= 12. However,
GSr(X ;P) = ffx2;x6;x12g;fx2;x8;x12g;fx3;x6;x12g;fx3;x8;x12gg:
Moreover, it can be verified that
fx2;x7;x12g; fx4;x6;x12g 2 GS(X ;P) and
fx2;x7;x12gDfx4;x6;x12g and fx4;x6;x12gDfx2;x7;x12g:
The next result shows that nonempty refined generalized stable set al-
ways exists for every abstract decision problem.
Theorem 4.2.8 For any (X ;P) 2W(X), GSr(X ;P) is nonempty.
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Proof. Let m(X ;P) = fX1 ;X2 ; : : : ;Xmg. For any Xi 2 m(X;Pcon), define
K(Xi ) = fx 2 Xi j cs(x) cs(y) f or any y 2 Xi g:
Take V = fx1;x2; : : : ;xmg where xi 2 K(Xi ) and 1 i m. Suppose there is
aW 2 GS(X ;P) withWDV . There are xi 2V and y 2W such that yPxi and
cs(y) > cs(xi). As xi 2 Xi 2 m(X;Pcon), we get y 2 Xk , which contradicts
xi 2 K(Xi ). 
As the notion of generalized stable sets is definable for the case of not
asymmetric binary relation D , here we generalized this notion to character-
ize refined generalized stable sets.
Theorem 4.2.9 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). GSr(X ;P) is the unique generalized sta-
ble set of (GS(X ;P);D).
Proof. Let m(X;Pcon) = fX1 ;X2 ; : : : ;Xmg, D(Xi ) = [xi2XiD(xi) and Ei =
Xi [D(Xi ) where 1 i m. Then m(Ei ;PconEi ) = fXi g. By Theorem 4.2.3,
we have that GS(Ei;PEi) = ffxigj xi 2 Xig where 1 i m.
First, we prove that D is acyclic on GS(Ei;PEi). If there are fxi1g, fxi2g,
: : :, fxikg 2 GS(Ei;PEi) such that fxi1gDfxi2g, fxi2gDfxi3g, : : :, fxik 1gDfxikg
and fxikgDfxi1g, then we have cs(xi1) > cs(xi2), : : :, cs(xik 1) > cs(xik) and
cs(xik)> cs(x
i
1). Contradiction. By Theorem 4.2.3, GSr(Ei;PEi) is a general-
ized stable set of (GS(Ei;PEi);D). Then, there is a fxitg 2 GSr(Ei;PEi) with
fxitgDtfxisg for any fxisg 2 GS(Ei;PEi)nGSr(Ei;PEi).
Next, we show that V 2 GSr(X ;P) if and only if V = [1imVi where
Vi 2 GSr(Ei;PEi). (i) Take V 2 GSr(X ;P). Let V \Xi = fxig where Xi 2
m(X;Pcon). Suppose there is an Xj 2 m(X;Pcon) with fx jg =2GSr(E j;PE j).
Then there exists a fy jg 2 GS(E j;PE j) with fy jgDfx jg implying y jPx j and
cs(y j) > cs(x j). Take V 0 = fy jg[V nfx jg. Then we have V 0 2 GS(X ;P)
and V 0DV . Contradiction. (ii) Let V = [1imVi where Vi 2 GSr(Ei;PEi).
Obviously, V 2 GS(X ;P). If V =2 GSr(X ;P), then there is a V 0 2 GS(X ;P)
such V 0DV , which indicate there are yi 2 V 0 and xi 2 V such that yiPxi and
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cs(yi) > cs(xi). Thus there is an Xi 2 m(X;Pcon) with xi;yi 2 Xi . As
fxig;fyig 2 GS(Ei;PEi), we get fxig =2 GSr(Ei;PEi). Contradiction.
Lastly, since GSr(X ;P) = m(GS(X ;P);D), GSr(X ;P) satisfies general-
ized internal stability defined with respect to D . It is sufficient to prove that
GSr(X ;P) satisfies generalized external stability defined with respect to D .
For any V 2 GS(X ;P)nGSr(X ;P), there is an Xt 2 m(X;Pcon) such that
V \Xt 2 GS(Et ;PEt ) but V \Xt =2 GSr(Et ;PEt ). Let V \Xt = fxtg. Then
there is a fytg 2 GSr(Et ;PEt ) with fytgDtfxtg. Then there are xt1, xt2, : : :, xts
with fytgDfxt1g, fxt1gDfxt2g, : : :,fxts 1gDfxtsg, fxtsgDfxtg. Take
V0 = fx1;x2; : : : ;xt 1;yt ;xt+1; : : : ;xmg;
V1 = fx1;x2; : : : ;xt 1;xt1;xt+1; : : : ;xmg;
V2 = fx1;x2; : : : ;xt 1;xt2;xt+1; : : : ;xmg;
: : :
Vs = fx1;x2; : : : ;xt 1;xts;xt+1; : : : ;xmg
where fxig 2 GSr(Ei;PEi) (1 i m and i 6= t). We get V0 2 GSr(X ;P) and
V1, V2, V3, : : :, Vs 2 GS(X ;P). Moreover, V0DV1, V1DV2, : : :, Vs 1DVs and
VsDV . Thus, V0DtV . 
The above theorem shows that any refined generalized stable is gener-
alized stable as defined with respect to D . The next theorem says that any
refined generalized stable set is contained in the unsurpassed set.
Theorem 4.2.10 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). V US(X ;P) for any V 2 GSr(X ;P).
Proof. Let V 2 GSr(X ;P) and x 2V . There exists an Xi 2 m(X;Pcon) with
x 2 Xi . Suppose there is a y 2 X with yPsx. Then we get yPx indicating
y 2 Xi and d(y)+b(x) b(y) d(x)> 0 implying cs(y)> cs(x). Take V 0 =
fyg[V nfxg. Then V 0 2 GS(X ;P) and V 0DV . Contradiction. 
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A refined generalized stable set could be a proper subset of the unsur-
passed set. For instance, reconsider (X ;P) in Figure 4.1. We have
GSr(X ;P) = ffx2g;fx3gg whileUS(X ;P) = fx2;x3;x5g:
Thus, a refined generalized stable set may be seen as a refinement of the un-
surpassed set. Based on this fact, we may conclude that refined generalized
stable sets have more discriminating power than the unsurpassed set.
Corollary 4.2.4 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). V UC(X ;P) for any V 2 GSr(X ;P).
This result could be obtained from Theorem 3.3.5 and Theorem 4.2.10.
It has been shown in [38] that every alternative in the uncovered set is Pare-
to optimal whenever dominance relation is deduced from pairwise majority
comparison. Consequently, the solution of refined generalized stable sets ex-
cludes the presence of Pareto suboptimal alternative(s) in this case as well.
The next result shows that the union of refined generalized stable sets
agrees with the unsurpassed set when dominance relation is complete.
Theorem 4.2.11 Let (X ;P) 2T (X). SV2GSr(X ;P)V =US(X ;P).
Proof. If P is complete, then we have jm(X;Pcon)j= 1. By Theorem 4.2.3
and Theorem 2.2.3, we have
GS(X ;P) = ffxg j x 2 AD(X ;P)g:
According to Corollary 3.3.1, we get US(X ;P) AD(X ;P). By Theorem
4.2.10, it is sufficient to prove that fxg 2 GSr(X ;P) for any x 2 US(X ;P).
Take x2US(X ;P). If fxg =2GSr(X ;P), there is a y2 X with yPx and cs(y)>
cs(x). Then d(y) b(y)> d(x) b(x). As P is complete, d(y) = jX j b(x) 
1. Thus, b(y)< b(x) and d(y)> d(x) implying yPsx. Contradiction. 
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4.2.4 concluding remark
In this section, we discussed generalized stable sets which appear to be stable
sets defined with resect to Pt . The theories of stable sets and of generalized
stable sets have some common features. Both stable set and generalized sta-
ble set are core-inclusive. Thus, both solutions can be treated as an extension
of the maximal alternative set. Second, both of them preserve inner consis-
tency in the sense that no alternative is dominated by another alternative in
the same set while neither of them is free from being dominated by alter-
native outside this set. Third, both stable set and generalized stable set are
proper subsets of alternative set whenever dominance relation is nonempty.
In general, such nice property is not possessed by the solutions discussed in
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3
The theory of generalized stable sets differs from the theory of stable
sets in the following aspects: a nonempty generalized stable set exists for
every abstract decision problem. That means, the theory of generalized stable
sets is able to deal with any cyclic dominance relation. In this respect, it
outperforms the theory of stable sets. Moreover, generalized stable sets have
the same cardinality number while this is not true for stable set solution.
Besides, generalized stable set varies with the changes of dominance relation
in a completely different way from that of stable set solution, as we discussed
in Remark 1.3.1 and Remark 4.2.1. In particular, the solution of generalized
stable set coincides with the maximal alternative set instead of stable set
solution if dominance relation is acyclic whereby there exists a unique of
stable set.
4.3 The theory of extended stable sets
In this section, we approach the existence problem of stable set by introduc-
ing a new binary relation. The motivation for proposing this relation is that
P is so strict that stable sets defined by it do not solve every abstract deci-
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sion problem while Pt is so weak that generalized stable sets defined by it
fail to turn out to be stable sets even if P is acyclic. To avoid this point, we
formulate a new binary relation (denoted by Pw ) which is weaker than P but
stricter than Pt . Then, we revisit the notion of stable set with Pw and arrive
at an extension of stable set (named Extended Stable Set).
4.3.1 Extended dominance and extended stable set
For any x;y 2 X , we say x and y are equipotent, denoted by xety, if either
x = y or xPty and yPtx. Generally, if xPty is counterbalanced by yPtx, it
is difficult to find arguments for choosing between x and y. The extended
dominance relation is defined as follows.
Definition 4.3.1 Let (X ;P) 2 W(X) and x;y 2 X. We say x w-dominates y,
denoted by xPwy, if there are z;w 2 X such that xetz, zPw and wety.
We say x w-dominates y if one of the equipotent alternatives of x domi-
nates one of the equipotent alternatives of y. The differences among P, Pt
and Pw can be specifically illustrated by the following example.
Example 4.3.1 Reconsider (X ;P) described in Figure 4.1. Then
x1etx1; x1Px2; x2etx2; x1etx2; x2Px3; x3etx3 and x1etx3; x3Px4; x4etx4;
x1etx2; x2Px5; x5etx5; x2etx2; x2Px3; x3etx3 and x2etx3; x3Px1; x1etx1;
x2etx3; x3Px4; x4etx4; x2etx2; x2Px5; x5etx5 and x3etx3; x3Px1; x1etx1;
x3etx1; x1Px2; x2etx2; x3etx3; x3Px4; x4etx4 and x3etx2; x2Px5; x5etx5;
x5etx5; x5Px4; x4etx4; x5etx5; x5Px6; x6etx6 and x6etx6; x6Px4; x4etx4:
Pw is presented by Figure 4.6 while Pt is described in Figure 4.2. As showed
in Figure 4.6, Pw is not asymmetric in this case.
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Fig. 4.6 (X ;Pw)
The relations between P, Pt and Pw are summarized in the following
Theorem.
Theorem 4.3.1 For any (X ;P) 2W(X), P Pw  Pt :
Proof. Take x;y 2 X . If xPy, then we get xPty. Take z= x;w= y, then xPwy.
If xPwy, there are z;w 2 X with xetz, zPt and tety, then we have xPty by the
transitivity of Pt . 
In general, given (X ;P) and x;y 2 X , it is possible that xPwy but not
xPy, and that xPty while neither xPwy nor xPy. For instance, in Figure 4.1,
we have that x1Pwx5 but not x1Px5, and that x1Ptx6, but neither x1Px6 nor
x1Pwx6. Thus, Pw is a weaker binary relation than P but a stronger binary
relation than Pt . By using Pw , we revisit the notion of stable sets and obtain
an alternative variation of stable set solution.
Definition 4.3.2 Let (X ;P) 2 W. A set V  X is called an extended stable
set of (X ;P) if it satisfies
(i) extended internal stability: 8x;y 2V, not xPwy;
(ii) extended external stability: 8y 2 X nV, there is an x 2V such that xPwy.
Let ES(X ;P) be the collection of extended stable sets of (X ;P). Clearly,
ES(X ;P) = S(X ;Pw). Extended internal stability states that no alternatives
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in an extended stable set w-dominates another alternative in the same set.
Extended external stability expresses that any alternative outside an extended
stable set is w-dominated by an alternative inside this set. It is important to
know that extended external stability does not exclude the possibility that an
alternative outside an extended stable set dominates (or t-dominates) some
alternative inside this set.
Example 4.3.2 Reconsider (X ;P) in Figure 4.1. No stable set exists for
(X ;P) and GS(X ;P) = ffx1g;fx2g;fx3gg. However,
ES(X ;P) = ffx1;x6g;fx2;x6g;fx3;x6gg:
Given x;y 2 X , since not xPwy implies not xPy, and not xPty implies
xPwy (not vice versa), extended internal stability is a stronger requirement
than internal stability while a weaker requirement than generalized internal
stability. No alternative in an extended stable set is dominated by another
alternative of the same kind. Therefore, the extended stable sets are free of
inner contradiction. On the other hand, as xPwy means xPty, and xPy im-
plies xPwy (not vice versa), extended external stability is a less demanding
constraint than external stability and a more demanding constraint than gen-
eralized external stability. Extended external stability plays a similar role as
external stability and generalized external stability in discrediting the non-
conformable behaviors. It ensures that once there is an alternative y outside
extended stable setV w-dominates an alternative x insideV , in return, ymust
be w-dominated by another alternative z inside V .
Definition 4.3.3 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). An x 2 X is said to be
(i) extended stable in (X ;P) if there is a V 2 ES(X ;P) with x 2V;
(ii) extended instable in (X ;P) if there is no V 2 ES(X ;P) with x 2V.
The above definition will be used to illustrate the properties of extended
stable sets in the sequel.
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4.3.2 The properties of extended stable set
The next theorem demonstrates that given an extended stable set V of (X ;P),
neither its proper subset nor its proper superset is an extended stable set.
Theorem 4.3.2 Let (X ;P) 2W(X) and V 2 ES(X ;V ).
(i) V is maximal in terms of set inclusion with respect to extended internal
stability;
(ii) V is minimal in terms of set inclusion with respect to extended external
stability.
Proof. Let V 2 ES(X ;P). If V is not maximal with respect to extended
internal stability, there must exist a nonempty V  M such that M satisfies
extended internal stability. Take an x 2M nV . Since V satisfies the extended
external stability, there is an alternative y 2V such that yPwx, which contra-
dicts that M satisfies extended internal stability.
IfV is not minimal with respect to extended external stability, there exists
a nonempty K such that K  V and K satisfies extended internal stability.
Take an z 2 V nK. Since K satisfies the extended external stability, there is
an alternative s2K such that sPwz, which contradicts the fact thatV satisfies
extended internal stability. 
In general, extended stability is neither cardinality maximal with regard
to extended internal stability nor cardinality minimal with regard to extended
external stability2.
Example 4.3.3 Consider (X ;P) in Figure 4.7. We get
ES(X ;P) = ffx1;x3gg:
Take V = fx1;x4;x5g. Since not xiPwx j for any xi;x j 2V, V satisfies extend-
2A solution S of (X ;P) is said to be (i) cardinality maximal with respect to extended
internal stability if there does not exist any other solutionS 0 that satisfies extended internal
stability and jS 0(X ;P)j > jS (X ;P)j; (ii) cardinality minimal with respect to extended ex-
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Fig. 4.7 (X ;P)
ed internal stability as well. However,
jfx1;x4;x5gj> jfx1;x3gj:
Consider (X ;P) in Figure 4.8. We have
ES(X ;P) = ffx1;x3;x6gg:
Take W = fx1;x5g. Because of x1Pwx2, x5Pwx4, x5Pwx3 and x5Pwx6, W
satisfies extended external stability. However,
jfx1;x5gj< jfx1;x3;x6gj:
Lemma 4.3.1 Let (X ;P) 2W(X) and Xi ;Xj 2 X. Then
Xi P
conXj i f and only i f xiP
wx j f or any xi 2 Xi and x j 2 Xj :
Proof. This conclusion follows straightforwardly from Definition 4.3.1. 
This lemma will be used to simplify the proof of the next theorem.
ternal stability if there does not exist any other solution S 0 that satisfies extended external
stability and jS 0(X ;P)j< jS (X ;P)j.
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Theorem 4.3.3 Let (X ;P) 2W(X) and S(X;Pcon) = ffX1 ;X2 ; : : : ;Xk gg.
W 2 ES(X ;P) i f and only i f W = fx1;x2; : : : ;xkg
where xi 2 Xi and 1 i k.
Proof. Let V  = fX1 ;X2 ; : : : ;Xk g and W = fx1;x2; : : : ;xkg where xi 2 Xi
and 1 i k. For any xi;x j 2W , there are distinct Xi ; Xj 2V  with xi 2 Xi
and x j 2 Xj . As not Xi PconXj , we get that not xiPwx j by Lemma 4.3.1. For
any yt 2 X nW , there exists an Xt such that yt 2 Xt . If Xt 2 V , there is a
zt 2 Xt with xtetzt and ztPyt implying xtPwyt . Otherwise Xt =2 V . Then
there is an Xs 2 V  such that Xs PconXt , which means xs 2 Xs and yt 2 Xt
with xsPwyt by Lemma 4.3.1.
Conversely, letW 2 ES(X ;P) andW  = fXi 2 Xjx 2W; x 2 Xi g. Ob-
viously,W SXi 2W  Xi . For any Xi ;Xj 2W , there exist two distinct xi;x j
with xi 2 Xi ;x j 2 Xj and not xiPwx j. If Xi PconXj , then xiPwx j by Lemma
4.3.1. Contradiction. Thus, not Xi PconXj . For any Xj 2X nW  and y j 2Xj ,
we have y j =2W . Then, there are xi 2W and xi 2 Xi 2W  such that xiPwy j,
which indicates x
0
iP
wy j for all x
0
i 2 Xi . Due to Xi 6= Xj , Xi PconXj directly
follows from Lemma 4.3.1. Thus,W  2 S(X;Pcon). If there is an Xm 2W 
such that jW \Xmj> 1, then there are two x;y2W with x;y2Xm 2W . Thus
xPty and yPtx, which implies xPwy. Contradiction. 
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The above theorem says that an extended stable set consists of alterna-
tives from stable strong components and any two alternative are from differ-
ent strong components. The next characterization theorem can be obtained
from this structural feature.
Theorem 4.3.4 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). Then
V 2 ES(X ;P) i f and only i f V =
[
1ik
Vi
where Vi 2 ES(Xi ;PXi ) and fX1 ;X2 ; : : : ;Xk g 2 ES(X;Pcon).
Proof. As Pcon is acyclic for any (X ;P) 2W(X), we have
ES(X;Pcon) = S(X;Pcon) and jS(X;Pcon)j= 1:
For any Xi 2 X, either Xi is a singleton set or PXi is a cycle containing all
the alternatives in Xi . By Theorem 4.3.3, Vi 2 ES(Xi ;RXi ) if and only if
jVij= 1. Then we get this conclusion. 
The above theorem shows that the notion of extended stable set is pro-
vided with the property of strong component consistence in the sense that
extended stable set chooses extended stable alternatives from extended sta-
ble strong components. In contrast, a given stable alternative may not belong
to any stable strong component whereas generalized stable set picks out gen-
eralized stable alternatives from generalized stable strong components.
A pleasant advantage of extended stable set solution is that it is able to
deal with every abstract decision problem.
Theorem 4.3.5 For any (X ;P) 2 W(X ;P), (X ;P) has a nonempty extended
stable set.
Proof. Lemma 1.2.2 guarantees Pcon is acyclic and Theorem 1.3.4 guar-
antees the existence of S(X;Pcon). By Theorem 4.3.3, we conclude that
nonempty extended stable set always exists. 
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The following corollary states the numbers of extended stable sets and
one feature concerning the size of extended stable sets.
Corollary 4.3.1 Let (X ;P) 2W(X) and S(X;Pcon) = ffX1 ;X2 ; : : : ;Xk gg.
(i) jES(X ;P)j= jX1 j jX2 j    jXk j;
(ii) jW1j= jW2j for any W1;W2 2 ES(X ;P).
Proof. It follows directly from Theorem 4.3.3 and Theorem 4.3.5. 
As a comparison, given an abstract decision problem, generalized stable
sets always have the same cardinality numbers while this is not true for stable
sets.
The following remark shows how is the sensitivity of extended stable sets
to the changes of underlying dominance relation.
Remark 4.3.1 Let (X ;P) 2W(X) and V 2 ES(X ;P).
(i) Take x 2 V. If P0 = P except xP0y where y 2 X, it is possible that x is
extended instable in (X ;P0).
(ii) Take x 2V and y2 X nV. If P0 = P except yP0z where z2 X, it is possible
that x is extended instable in (X ;P0).
(iii) Take P0V[fzg = PV[fzg for any z 2 X. It is possible that V =2 ES(X ;P0).
Given an extended stable set V with an alternative x in it, Remark 4.3.1-
(i) says that x may turn into an extended instable one by strengthening its
dominion and everything else is unchanged; Remark 4.3.1-(ii) expresses that
x might be overturned into an extended instable one by enlarging the domin-
ion of some alternative y outside V whereas Remark 4.3.1-(iii) states that V
is not necessarily to be an extended stable set any more under altering the
dominance relation between alternatives outside V . To clarify these points,
see the following example.
Example 4.3.4 Consider (X ;P) in Figure 4.9. We have
S(X;Pcon) = fffx1g;fx5ggg:
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Fig. 4.10 (X ;P0)
According to Theorem 4.3.3, we get
ES(X ;P) = ffx1;x5gg:
(i) Take (X ;P0) in Figure 4.10 where P0 = P except x5P0x3. We obtain
ES(X ;P0) = ffx1gg:
In spite of the improvement of x5’s dominion, x5 is extended instable in
(X ;P0).
(ii) Take (X ;P\) in Figure 4.11 where P\ = P except x3P\x1. We have
ES(X ;P\) = ffx1g;fx2g;fx3g;fx4gg:
Due to the reinforcement of x3, x5 is discredited into an extended instable
alternative in (X ;P\).
(iii) Take (X ;P?) in Figure 4.12 where P? = P except x3Px4. We have
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Fig. 4.11 (X ;P\)
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Fig. 4.12 (X ;P?)
ES(X ;P?) = ffx1;x4;x3gg:
By removing the dominance relation between x3 and x4 which are extended
instable in (X ;P), x5 is not extended stable any more in (X ;P?). Thus, we
get
fx1;x5g =2 ES(X ;P?):
4.3.3 The relations with other solutions
Theorem 4.3.6 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). Then
(i) m(X ;P)TW2ES(X ;P)W;
(ii) AD(X ;P)SW2ES(X ;P)W.
Proof. (i) Let x 2 m(X ;P). Suppose there is aW 2 ES(X ;P) such that x =2W .
Then, there exists a y 2W such that yPwx implying yPtx. Hence, there must
be some z 2 X with zPx, which contradicts x 2 m(X ;P).
(ii) This result follows from Theorem 2.2.3 and Theorem 4.3.3. 
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The above theorem shows that extended stable sets are core-inclusive
but not necessarily contained in the admissible set. In contrast, generalized
stable sets are both core-inclusive and included in the admissible set.
In the next theorem, we present a sufficient condition for extended stable
set solution to coincide with the solutions of stable sets and of generalized
stable sets.
Theorem 4.3.7 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). Then
(i) ES(X ;P) = S(X ;P) if P is acyclic;
(ii) ES(X ;P) = GS(X ;P) if P is complete;
(iii) S(X ;P) = ES(X ;P) = GS(X ;P) if P is transitive.
Proof. (i) Take (X ;P) 2 W(X). If P is acyclic, then fxg 2 X for any x 2 X .
Thus (X ;P) = (X;Pcon) = (X ;Pw). Then ES(X ;P) = S(X ;P).
(ii) It is sufficient to prove that Pw is equivalent to Pt . Given P is com-
plete, for any x;y 2 X , if xPwy then xPty by Theorem 4.3.1. Conversely, for
any x;y 2 X with xPty. Since P is complete, if xPy, then xPwy. Otherwise,
yPx. Then, xety implying xPwy.
(iii) If P is transitive, then P is acyclic. Thus (X ;Pt) = (X ;P) = (X ;Pw).
Therefore, S(X ;R) = ES(X ;R) = GS(X ;R). 
The following result accounts for the inclusiveness relation between sta-
ble set, extended stable set and generalized stable set.
Theorem 4.3.8 Let (X ;P) 2W(X) and V 2 ES(X ;R). Then
(i) there is no W 2 S(X ;P) such that W (V;
(ii) there is a W 2 GS(X ;P) such that W V.
Proof. (i) Suppose there is a W 2 S(X ;P) such that W ( V . For any y 2
V nW , there exists an x 2W with xPy implying xPwy. Then V violates ex-
tended internal stability, which contradicts V 2 ES(X ;P).
(ii) Let m(X;Pcon) = fX1 ;X2 ; : : : ;Xmg. As m(X;Rcon)  V  for V  2
S(X;Pcon), by Theorem 4.3.3 we get Xi \V 6= /0 where i= 1;2; : : : ;m. Take
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W = fx1;x2; : : : ;xmg where xi 2 Xi \V . According to Theorem 4.2.3, we get
W 2 GS(X ;P) andW V . 
Intuitively, as the stability of extended stable sets is in between the sta-
bility of stable sets and that of generalized stable sets, it is expected that the
size of any extended stable set is in between the size of a generalized stable
set and that of a stable set when stable set solution exists. However, things
go contrary to our wish. The size of an extended stable set is always larger
than or equal to that of a generalized stable set but not necessarily smaller
than the size of a stable set. To clarify this, consider the following example.
Example 4.3.5 Consider (X ;R) in Figure 4.8. We have that
S(X ;P) = ffx1;x5gg GS(X ;P) = ffx1gg and ES(X ;P) = ffx1;x3;x6gg:
Obviously, jfx1;x3;x6gj> jfx1;x5gj.
4.3.4 Concluding remark
In this section, we introduced an extended dominance relation Pw on finite
X which is weaker than P, but stricter than Pt . Then, we formulated a so-
lution called extended stable set which appears to be stable sets as defined
with respect to Pw . Both stable set and extended stable set are core-inclusive
and satisfies inner consistency. The solution of stable sets does not permit its
existence in all abstract decision problems while nonempty extended stable
sets always exist for every abstract decision problem. From this respect, the
theory of extended stable set improves the theory of stable sets. The main
differences between these two solutions are as follows: First, extended stable
set is made up of extended stable alternatives of extended stable strong com-
ponents while stable set may contain alternatives which do not belong to any
stable strong component. Second, stable set solution is free from changing
with the alteration of instable alternative’s dominion while extended stable
set solution is not. The solution of generalized stable sets defined on Pt may
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fail to coincide with the sable set solution if P is acyclic. In this case, the
solution of extended stable sets agrees with stable set solution. This implies
that the solution of extended stable sets lies closer to the solution of stable
sets than the solution of generalized stable sets.
4.4 Application in multi-criteria decision analy-
sis
Multi-criteria decision analysis is concerned with decomposing, structuring
and solving decision problems involving multiple objectives. The main pur-
pose of this analysis is to help decision-makers gain more understanding and
insight of their problems. Usually, decision makers are faced with problem
for which no optimal solution exists. Thus, it is necessary to use techniques
to differentiate solutions or to reduce a larger number of options to a few.
In this section, we study an outranking method called ELECTERE 1 from
multi-criteria decision analysis which is advocated by [47], and shows how
the theories of generalized stable set and extended stable sets may be used
to accommodate the shortcoming of this method. The following definitions
concerning this method are mainly from [50].
Let X be a set of potential options in which we either choose a single
option or a subset of options considered as "good". A criterion g defined
on X is a function for evaluating the options in X . Given a set of criteria
fg1;g2; : : : ;gng, we say that an option x dominates an option y if
(1) for any 1 i n, gi(x) gi(x);
(2) there exists at least one g j such that g j(x)> g j(x).
As such a dominance relation may be too poorly discriminative to be em-
ployed in multi-criteria decision problems, the notion of outranking relation
was proposed to facilitate the analysing of multi-criteria decision problems.
The idea of outranking relation is as follows: say an option x outranks
an option y if and only if there is a strong (weighted) majority in favour
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of x and if there is no strong opposition against x. These two principles
are respectively called Concordance Principle and Discordance Principle in
[47].
The concordance of the different criteria in favor of the preference (or
indifference) of x to y is defined as
c(x;y) =
1
åi2Cwi
å
i2Cxy
wi
where
• C is the collection of criteria;
• Cxy is the collection of criteria for which x is preferred to or indifferent
from y;
• wi is a constant representing the relative importance of each criterion.
Given a pair of action (x;y), even if c(x;y) is close to 1, it still cannot
be concluded that x is better than y since there may exist a criterion g j for
which g j(y) g j(x) is large. In view of this point, a discordance indicator is
defined as follows:
d(x;y) =
(
0 if Dxy = /0;
1
dmax j2Dxyjg j(y) g j(x)j otherwise:
where
• d is the maximum difference between two options on a particular cri-
terion;
• Dxy is the set of criteria for which y is preferred to x;
• g j(x) is the score of action x on criterion g j;
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The outranking relation on X is defined as follows:
x outranks y; denoted by xOy; i f both c(x;y) p and d(x;y) q
where p is a majority threshold and q is a threshold representing the differ-
ence beyond which there is a veto on criterion g j.
The method of ELECTRE I attempts to find a subset V of X which is a
stable set defined with respect to the outranking relation over X . The fol-
lowing case will show that an outranking relation is necessarily acyclic. In
this case, ELECTRE I method3 may not work. Then, we may consider gen-
eralized stable sets and extended stable sets as alternative solutions of the
outranking relation. More specifically, consider the following case.
A householder plans to purchase a new car. There are total of six cars
to be taken into consideration. The criteria used are price, comfort, speed
and looks. Table 4.1 contains details of information relevant to the six cars
and the weight assigned to the different criteria. The outranking of xi by x j
is refused if the difference between the prices of x j and xi is larger than 50
thousands. The majority threshold p is 23 .
In the above case, the option set X = fx1;x2; : : : ;x6g. The maximum
difference between two options on price criterion is 120 thousands. Thus,
we have q= 512 where d = 120 (thousands). The concordance indicators and
discordance indicators are listed in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 respectively. The
outranking relation is defined as follows:
f or any xi;x j 2 X ; xiOx j i f both c(xi;x j) 23 and d(xi;x j)
5
12
:
3An outranking method is made up of two steps: (i) the construction of the outranking
relation; (ii) the making use of this relation to select an alternative or a subset of alternatives.
Different treatments were used for the above steps according to the contents and formulation
of problems. The noted ones are the methods of ELECTRE I in [47], ELECTRE II in [48]
and ELECTRE III in [49] which were originally proposed and theoretically developed by a
group of researchers around Roy.
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Option x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 weight
Price 310 210 250 190 190 190 5
Comfort E A A A W E 4
Speed F A F F A S 3
Looks D O D U D O 3
Table 4.1 E=excellent; A=average; W=weak; F=fast; S=slow;U=ugly;
O=ordinary; D=distinctive.
Option x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6
x1 23
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
3
x2 13
3
5
7
15
7
15
2
5
x3 1115
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
5
x4 815
4
5
4
5
4
5
8
15
x5 815
11
15
8
15
8
15
11
15
x6 35
4
5
3
5
4
5
3
5
Table 4.2 Concordance Indicators
Option x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6
x1 56
1
2 1 1 1
x2 0 0 16
1
6
1
6
x3 0 13
1
2
1
2
1
2
x4 0 0 0 0 0
x5 0 0 0 0 0
x6 0 0 0 0 0
Table 4.3 Discordance Indicators
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Fig. 4.13 (X ;O)
X
2
*
X
1
*
X
4
*
X
3
*
Fig. 4.14 (X;Ocon)
In this case, O is presented in Figure 4.13. The contraction of (X ;O) is
presented in Figure 4.14 where X1 = fx1g, X2 = fx2g, X3 = fx3g and X4 =
fx4;x5;x6g. Then, we have that
m(X ;O) = /0 and no stable exists f or (X ;O);
GS(X ;O) = ffx4g;fx5g;fx6gg and GSr(X ;O) = ffx4g;fx6gg;
ES(X ;O) = ffx1;x4g;fx1;x5g;fx1;x6gg:
As we have shown in the above case, given the outranking relation, the
stable set solution for this relation may not exist while this is not true for
both the solutions of generalized stable set and of extended stable set. As we
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have clarified in this chapter, both the theories of generalized stable sets and
of extended stable sets can be regarded as the variants of stable set theory.
Based on these arguments, we believe that the theory of generalized stable
sets and that of extended stable sets may replace the role of stable sets in
multi-criteria decision making analysis.

Chapter 5
Two Reformulations of Stable Set
Theory
5.1 Introduction
It has been shown in Section 1.3.1 that stable set solution may not exist
in some abstract decision problems, and that an alternative inside a stable
set might be dominated by some alternative outside this set. Moreover, the
notion of stable set is incompatible with that of maximal alternative set. In
view of these facts, a reformulation of stable sets called m-stable sets was
introduced in [43].
It can be shown that nonempty m-stable sets exist for every abstract de-
cision problem, and that alternatives in an m-stable set are free from being
dominated by any alternative outside this set. Furthermore, the maximal
alternative set also satisfies the stability of m-stable set. By contrast, nei-
ther extended stable set solution nor the solution of generalized stable sets is
compatible with the notion of maximal alternative set. That is, the maximal
alternative set is neither an extended stable set nor a generalized stable set in
general. However, this reformulation has disadvantages elsewhere. First, the
solution of m-stable set may include all the alternatives under consideration.
110 Two Reformulations of Stable Set Theory
In this case, this solution does not discriminate alternatives at all and any
refinement of this solution counters the stability of m-stable set. Second, an
alternative x in an m-stable set is dominated by another alternative y in the
same set. This is a violation of what [66] called internal stability.
Here, we propose an alternative reformulation called w-stable set which
can accommodate both mentioned disadvantages of m-stable sets. It will be
showed that nonempty w-stable sets exist and are proper subsets of X for
any abstract decision problem. Moreover, no alternative in a w-stable set is
dominated by another alternative in this set. In other words, w-stable sets
satisfy internal stability. In this respect, the notion of w-stable sets differs
fundamentally from the concept of m-stable sets. We also make a further
comparison between w-stable sets and m-stable sets, and investigate its re-
lations with other variants of stable sets discussed in the previous chapters.
These solutions are the admissible set in [29], generalized stable sets in [64]
and extended stable sets in [23]. Finally, to narrow the collection of w-stable
sets, we formulate a selection procedure by means of which we may pick out
more attractive w-stable sets called refined w-stable sets. We also show the
features of these refined w-stable sets by making a comparison with other
solutions.
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we
revisit the theory of m-stable sets which is a preparation for the theory of w-
stables sets. We also study a selection procedure which was used to choose a
particular m-stable set. The results in this section are mainly taken from [43]
and [61]. Section 5.3 is dedicated to our theory of w-stable sets that is mainly
based on the work of [25]. In this section, we characterize this solution
with the technique of contraction and investigate the relationships between
w-stable sets, m-stable sets and the other solutions presented in Chapter 2
and Chapter 3. Besides, we propose a selection approach by which more
appealing w-stable sets may be filtered out. Finally, we offer an application
case to illustrate the working of our theory in Section 5.4.
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5.2 The theory of m-stable sets
To accommodate the shortcomings of stable set solution, a reformulation
of Von Neumann-Morgenstern’s stability called m-stability was proposed in
[43] by modifying the criteria of internal stability and of external stability.
Definition 5.2.1 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). A set V  X is called an m-stable set of
(X ;P) if it satisfies
(i) m-internal stability: 8x;y 2V, if xPty, then yPtx;
(ii) m-external stability: 8y 2 X nV and x 2V, not yPtx.
Denote by MS(X ;P) the collection of m-stable sets of (X ;P). The argu-
ments for this reformulating were stated in [43] as follows: First, an alter-
native x in a selected set should not be left out from the selected set by y
whenever x is t-dominated by y, and in return y is also t-dominated by x.
Since both x and y are in the same dominance cycle, if x is excluded from the
selected set, then for the same reason, all the alternative in this cycle should
not belong to the selected set. Consequently, both alternatives may belong to
the selected set. Second, as external stability does not exclude that an x in a
stable set is dominated by another alternative y out this set, it might be better
to replace x with the alternative y. To avoid this problem, m-external stability
was formulated which ensures that no alternatives outside the m-stable set
dominates some alternative inside this set.
Example 5.2.1 Consider (X ;P) described1 in Figure 5.1. For any xi;x j 2
fx2;x3;x4g and xk 2 X n fx2;x3;x4g, xiPtx j and not xkPtxi. Moreover, not
xkPtx5 for any xk 2 X nfx5g. Thus, we get
MS(X ;P) = ffx2;x3;x4g;fx5g;fx2;x3;x4;x5gg:
Clearly, m-internal stability does not preclude the situation where one
alternative in an m-stable set dominates another alternative in the same set.
1This example is taken from [43] in which it was used to describe the case of a market
with indivisible goods.
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Fig. 5.1 (X ;P)
Thus, m-internal stability fails to satisifies inner consistency. However, m-
external stability ensures that no alternative outside an m-stable set domi-
nates any other alternative inside this set. Therefore, m-internal stability is
weaker than internal stability whereas m-external stability is stricter than ex-
ternal stability.
5.2.1 The properties of m-stable set
Theorem 5.2.1 (Peris and Subiza 2013) Let (X ;P) 2W(X). Then
V 2MS(X ;P) if and only if V =
[
Xi 2T 
Xi
where T   m(X;Pcon):
Proof. Let V =
S
Xi 2T  X

i where T
  m(X;Rcon). (i) Take any xi;x j 2 V .
If there are different Xi ;Xj 2 m(X;Pcon) with xi 2 Xi and x j 2 Xj , then
neither xiPtx j nor x jPtxi. Otherwise, there is an Xt 2 m(X;Pcon) such that
either Xt PconXi or Xt PconXj . Contradiction. If there exists an Xk 2 T 
such that xi;x j 2 Xk , then xiPtx j and x jPtxi. (ii) Take any yi 2 X nV and
y j 2V . There are distinct Xi ;Xj 2 m(X;Pcon) with yi 2 Xi and y j 2 Xj . As
Xj 2 m(X;Pcon), not Xk PconXj for any Xk 2 X nfXj g, which implies not
yPx for any x2 Xj and y2 Xk . Thus, not yiPty j. Then, we getV 2MS(X ;P).
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Conversely, let V 2MS(X ;P) and V  = fXi 2 Xjx 2V; x 2 Xi g. Then,
V  SQ2V Q. If xi 2 V , then yi 2 V for any yi 2 Xi nfxig where xi 2 Xi .
Thus V =
S
T 2V  T . For any Xi ;Xj 2 V , if Xi PconXj , there exist xi;x j
with xi 2 Xi ;x j 2 Xj and xiPx j. Then yiPty j and not y jPtyi for any yi 2
Xi ;y j 2 Xj , which means there exist x;y 2 V such that xPty and not yPtx.
Contradiction. Let Xi 2V  and Xj 2 X nV . If Xj PconXi , there are y j 2 Xj
and yi 2 Xi such that y jPyi. Then there is a y j 2 X nV and xi 2 V such that
y jPtxi. Contradiction. Then V   m(X;Pcon). 
A different contraction way was used in [43] to characterizem-stable sets
where the strong component and its collection were termed as class and quo-
tient set respectively, and the binary relation between strong components was
defined via Pt rather than P. The binary relation on the strong components
in [43] agrees with Pt while Pcon coincides with P whenever dominance
relation P is acyclic. But, the maximal strong components under both con-
traction techniques are same. See [42] for additional details of the quotient
set theory.
The above theorem shows that m-stable sets are made up of the union
of alternatives of maximal strong components. For any (X ;P) 2 W, Lemma
1.2.2 guarantees Pcon is acyclic and Theorem 1.3.1 guarantees the existence
of m(X;Pcon). Thus, nonempty m-stable sets always exist.
Corollary 5.2.1 (Peris and Subiza 2013) Let (X ;P) 2W(X). Then,
(i) V1\V2 2MS(X ;P) for any V1;V2 2MS(X ;P);
(ii) V1[V2 2MS(X ;P) for any V1;V2 2MS(X ;P).
Proof. (i) and (ii) follow directly from Theorem 5.2.1. 
Theorem 5.2.2 (Peris and Subiza 2013) Let (X ;P) 2W(X). Then
m(X ;P) 2MS(X ;P) and AD(X ;P) 2MS(X ;P):
Proof. It follows from Theorem 1.3.2 and Theorem 2.2.3. 
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The above theorem shows that the notion of m-stable sets comprises both
the notion of maximal alternative set and that of admissible set. In contrast,
the collection of stable sets includes neither the maximal alternative set nor
the admissible set.
The following remark says that neither stable set solution nor its exten-
sion discussed in Chapter 3 contains an m-stable set in general.
Remark 5.2.1 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). Then
(i) given V 2 S(X ;P), there may not exist a W 2MS(X ;P) with W V;
(ii) given V 2 ES(X ;P), there may not exist a W 2MS(X ;P) with W V;
(iii) given V 2 GS(X ;P), there may not exist a W 2MS(X ;P) with W V.
To verify the above remark, reconsider (X ;P) in Figure 1.3. We get
fx1;x3;x6;x7g 2 S(X ;P); fx2;x6;x7g 2 ES(X ;P) and fx4g 2 GS(X ;P):
Due to m(X;Pcon) = ffx1;x2;x3;x4gg, by Theorem 5.2.1, we get
MS(X ;P) = ffx1;x2;x3;x4gg:
Clearly, we get
fx1;x2;x3;x4g* fx1;x3;x6;x7g;
fx1;x2;x3;x4g* fx2;x6;x7g and fx1;x2;x3;x4g* fx4g:
5.2.2 A selection over m-stable sets
Theorem 5.2.1 shows that the collection of m-stable sets might be very large.
Moreover, a given m-stable set may exclude maximal alternatives even if the
maximal alternative set is nonempty. Thus, it makes sense to narrow the
collection of m-stable sets. The following approach was proposed in [61] to
pick out a particular m-stable set.
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Let (X ;P) 2W(X) and x 2 X . Denote by
bt(x) = jfy 2 X j yPtxgj and dt(x) = jfy 2 X j xPtygj:
TakeM(X ;P) =
S
Xi 2m(X;Pcon)X

i . ThenM(X ;P) is processed in the follow-
ing way:
Step 1 Choose alternatives from M(X ;P) that are minimally t-dominated.
Let Kt(X ;P) be the set of these alternatives. Formally
Kt(X ;P) = fx 2M(X ;P) j bt(x) bt(y) f or any y 2M(X ;P)g:
Step 2 Choose alternatives from Kt(X ;P) which are t-maximally dominant.
Let Qt(X ;P) be the set of these alternatives. Formally
Qt(X ;P) = fx 2 Kt(X ;P) j dt(x) dt(y) f or any y 2 Kt(X ;P)g:
With the above auxiliary steps, a particular m-stable set, called a refined
m-stable set, is defined as follows.
Definition 5.2.2 Let (X ;P) 2 W(X). Qt(X ;P) is called a refined m-stable
set. Denote by MSr(X ;P) this refined m-stable set of (X ;P).
As the cardinality of X is finite, and Step 1 and Step 2 are well-defined, a
nonempty refined m-stable set always exists. In order to understand the main
point of this concept, we compute the refined m-stable set for the following
example.
Example 5.2.2 Consider (X ;P) in Figure 5.2. We get
M(X ;P) = X nfx5;x9;x10;x11g:
bt(x1) = bt(x2) = bt(x3) = bt(x4) = 3;
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bt(x6) = bt(x7) = bt(x8) = 2:
Thus, Kt(X ;P) = fx6;x7;x8g. As d(x6) = d(x7) = d(x8) = 6, we get
MSr(X ;P) = fx6;x7;x8g:
In contrast, according to Theorem 5.2.1, we have
MS(X ;P) = ffx1;x2;x3;x4g;fx6;x7;x8g;fx1;x2;x3;x4;x6;x7;x8gg:
Theorem 5.2.3 (Subiza and Peris 2014) Let (X ;P) 2W(X). Then
(i) MSr(X ;P) = fxjx 2 argmaxfdt(x) j x 2 argminfbt(x) j x 2 Xggg:
(ii) MSr(X ;P) m(X ;P) if m(X ;P) 6= /0.
Proof. The proof was given in [61, p80]. 
In fact, the refined m-stable set selects from those alternatives which are
t-dominated by as few elements as possible and then, from these ones, those
which t-dominate as many alternatives as possible. Furthermore, a refined
m-stable set can be properly included in the maximal alternative set. Hence,
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the solution of refined m-stable set could also be considered as a refinement
of the maximal alternative set.
Theorem 5.2.4 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). Then
(i) MSr(X ;P) = AD(X ;P) if P is complete;
(ii) MSr(X ;P) = X if (X ;P) is strongly connected.
Proof. (i) If P is complete, then
argminfbt(x) j x 2 Xg= argmaxfdt(x) j x 2 Xg and jm(X;Pcon)j= 1:
Moveover, xPty and not yPtx for any x 2 M(X ;P) and y 2 X nM(X ;P). If
zPtx then zPty for any z 2 X nfx;yg. Thus, bt(x)< bt(y) and
Kt(X ;P) = argminfbt(x) j x 2 Xg and Qt(X ;P) = argmaxfdt(x) j x 2 Xg:
By Theorem 4.2.1, we getMSr(X ;P) = fx j x 2M(X ;P)g= AD(X ;P).
(ii) M(X ;P) = X if (X ;P) is strongly connected. By Theorem 5.2.1,
bt(x) = bt(y) and dt(x) = dt(y) for any x;y 2 X :
Then, the refined m-stable set includes every alternative in X , which follows
from Definition 5.2.2. 
Obviously, the drawback of this selection procedure arises when domi-
nance relation is a cycle involving every alternative under consideration. In
this situation, the refined m-stable set does not discriminate alternatives at
all. Moreover, any further decision process which chooses alternatives from
this set goes against the stability of m-stable set.
5.2.3 Concluding remark
In this section, we discussed the theory of m-stable sets which was proposed
as a reformulation of stable set solution. The solution of m-stable set is
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nonempty for every abstract decision problem, and both the maximal alter-
native set and the admissible set are m-stable sets rather than stable sets in
general. Thus the solution of m-stable sets is compatible with the maximal
alternative set solution and the admissible set solution. This is not true for
the solution of stable sets. Moreover, m-stable sets are free from being dom-
inated by alternatives outside it. Based on these facts, the notion of w-stable
sets improves the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern’s stability. By us-
ing the technique of contraction, we showed that m-stable sets are made up
of the unions of alternatives of (some) maximal strong components. When
dominance relation is complete, m-stable set agrees with the admissible set.
Thus, such solution is provided with some shortcomings possessed by the so-
lution of admissible set. Two fundamental differences between m-stable set
solution and stable set solution, generalized stable set solution and extended
stable set solution are: (i) the solution of m-stable sets violates the internal
consistency defined by [66] while the other solutions retain this property; (ii)
m-stable set solution prevents the chosen alternative from being dominated
by any unchosen but the other solutions permit the presence of such domi-
nance.
5.3 The theory of w-stable sets
In the last section, we have shown that the solution ofm-stable sets solves the
existence problem of stable set and precludes an alternative in anm-stable set
to be dominated by any alternative outside this set. However, the solution of
m-stable set may include all the alternatives under consideration. Moreover,
an m-stable set V may not be free from inner consistency in the sense that an
alternative x in V is dominated by another alternative y in the same set.
In view of these facts, we propose a reformulation of m-stable sets in this
section. This reformulated solution is expected to (i) be nonempty for every
abstract decision problem; (ii) preserve internal stability in the sense that no
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alternative in a selected set is dominated by any other alternative in the same
set; (iii) be a proper subset of alternative set X . To achieve these objectives,
we introduce the concept of w-stable sets.
Definition 5.3.1 Let (X ;P) 2 W(X). A set V  X is called a w-stable set of
(X ;P) if it satisfies
(i) w-internal stability: 8x;y 2V, not xPty;
(ii) w-external stability: 8x 2V and y 2 X nV, if yPtx then xPty.
Denote by WS(X ;P) the collection of w-stable sets of (X ;P). The re-
quirement of w-internal stability works as a consistency condition. It guar-
antees that standards of behavior is free from inner contradiction. More-
over, w-external stability plays a role of correction by discrediting the non-
conformable overturning. That is, once an alternative x outside a selected set
V overrules any alternative y in V via t-dominance relation, then x in return
is certainly overruled by the alternative y in an indirect way.
Example 5.3.1 Reconsider (X ;P) in Figure 5.1. For any xi 2 fx2;x3;x4g
and x j 2X nfxig, if xiPtx j, then x jPtxi. And not xkPtx5 for any xk 2X nfx5g.
Thus, WS(X ;P) = ffx2g;fx3g;fx4g;fx5g;fx2;x5g;fx3;x5g;fx4;x5gg:
It is important to say that internal stability of w-stable sets implies inter-
nal stability of stable sets and differs in this sense from internal stability of
m-stable sets. In addition, external stability of w-stable sets is a less demand-
ing constraint than internal stability of m-stable sets.
5.3.1 The properties of w-stable set
The following theorem gives a structural characterization of w-stable sets.
This result is typically obtained by using the contraction of (X ;P).
Theorem 5.3.1 Let (X ;P) 2W(X) and m(X;Pcon) = fX1 ;X2 ; : : : ;Xmg.
W 2WS(X ;P) if and only if W  fx1; : : : ;xmg
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where xi 2 Xi and 1 i m.
Proof. Let W  fx1; : : : ;xmg where xi 2 Xi and 1  i  m. (i) For any
xi;x j 2W , if xiPtx j, there are y j 2 Xj and yt 2 Xt 2 X nXj such that ytPy j,
which contradicts with Xj 2 m(X;Pcon). (ii) For any x j 2W and yk 2 X nW
with ykPtx j, because of Xj 2 m(X;Pcon), yk 2 Xj and x jPtyk.
Conversely, letW 2WS(X ;P) andW = fXi 2Xjx2W; x2Xi g. Then,
W ST2W  T . For any Xi ;Xj 2W , if Xi PconXj , there exist xi;x j with xi 2
Xi ;x j 2 Xj and xiPx j. Thus, yiPty j for any yi 2 Xi ;y j 2 Xj . Contradiction.
For any Xi 2W  and Xj 2 X nW , if Xj PconXi , there are y j 2 Xj and yi 2
Xi with y jPyi. Then, there exist xi 2 Xi 2W , xi 2W and x j 2 X nW such
that y jPtxi but not xiPty j. Contradiction. Thus, W   m(X;Pcon). Since
not xPty for any x;y 2W , jW \Xi j= 1 for any Xi 2W . 
According to Theorem 5.3.1, the solution of w-stable set has a close re-
lationship with the solutions of generalized stable sets and of m-stable sets.
Generalized stable sets just pick one alternative from every maximal strong
component and m-stable sets are made up of the unions of alternatives of
(some) maximal strong components. As a comparison, w-stable sets select
one alternative from each strong components defining an m-stable set and
are just nonempty subsets of the family of generalized stable sets.
For any (X ;P) 2 W(X), Lemma 1.2.2 ensures that Pcon is acyclic and
Theorem 1.3.1 ensures the existence of m(X;Pcon). Hence, nonempty w-
stable sets always exist.
Corollary 5.3.1 Let (X ;P) 2W(X) and V 2WS(X ;P). Then
(i) V is a proper subset of X;
(ii) for any W V, W 2WS(X ;P);
(iii) for any W 2WS(X ;P), V \W 2WS(X ;P) if V \W 6= /0.
Proof. (i) Suppose V coincides with X . Because P is nonempty, there exist
x;y 2 X with xPy. Thus V does not satisfy internal stability. Contradiction.
(ii) and (iii) follow straightforwardly from Theorem 5.3.1. 
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It is worth mentioning that a w-stable set may not be core-inclusive and
that the union of two w-stable sets is not necessarily a w-stable set. In con-
trast, as we have shown in Section 5.2.1, m-stable set solution is not core-
inclusive as well, but the union and the nonempty intersection of two m-
stable sets both are m-stable sets. Note that any nonempty subset of w-stable
set is also a w-stable set while a nonempty subset of m-stable set is not neces-
sarily an m-stable set. That means, any refinement of w-stable set preserves
the stability of w-stable set while a refinement of m-stable set may violate
the stability of m-stable set.
In order to illustrate w-stable set solution, we explore its relations with
m-stable sets and other solutions presented in previous sections.
Theorem 5.3.2 For any (X ;P) 2W(X), we have that
m(X ;P) 2WS(X ;P) and GS(X ;P)WS(X ;P):
Proof. This result follows from Theorem 4.2.3 and Theorem 5.2.1. 
The above theorem shows that the notion of w-stable sets comprises both
the notions of maximal alternative set and of generalized stable sets. In con-
trast, the notion ofm-stable sets generalizes the notion of maximal alternative
set and that of the admissible set.
Theorem 5.3.3 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). Then
(i) for any V 2 S(X ;P), there exists a W 2WS(X ;P) with W V;
(ii) for any V 2 ES(X ;P), there exists a W 2WS(X ;P) with W V;
(iii) for any V 2MS(X ;P), there exists a W 2WS(X ;P) with W V.
Proof. (i) Let V 2 S(X ;P) and m(X;Pcon) = fX1 ;X2 ; : : : ;Xmg. Then,
V \Xi 6= /0 for any Xi 2 m(X;Pcon):
Otherwise, if there is an Xj 2 m(X;Pcon) withV \Xj = /0. Take any y 2 Xj ,
there is an x 2 V such that xPy which contradicts Xj 2 m(X;Pcon). Take
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W = fx1;x2; : : : ;xmg where xi 2V \Xi and Xi 2 m(X;Pcon). Then,W V .
By Theorem 5.3.1, we getW 2WS(X ;P).
(ii) Let V 2 ES(X ;P) and m(X;Pcon) = fX1 ; : : : ;Xmg. By Theorem
4.3.3,V \Xi 6= /0 for any Xi 2 m(X;Pcon). TakeW = fx1;x2; : : : ;xmg where
xi 2V \Xi and Xi 2 m(X;Pcon). Then,W V . By Theorem 5.3.1, we get
W 2WS(X ;P).
(iii) This result follows from Theorem 5.2.1 and Theorem 5.3.1. 
Theorem 5.3.3 expresses the facts that any stable set, extended stable set
and m-stable set contain a w-stable set. However, both extended stable set
and stable set may not include any m-stable set.
The next theorem shows under which conditions the solution of w-stable
sets is the same as the solution of generalized stable sets and that of m-stable
sets respectively.
Theorem 5.3.4 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). Then,
(i) WS(X ;P) = GS(X ;P) if P is complete;
(ii) WS(X ;P) =MS(X ;P) if P is acyclic.
Proof. (i) According to Theorem 4.2.3 and Theorem 5.3.1, it is sufficient
to prove that jm(X;Pcon)j = 1 if P is complete. Suppose there are distinct
Xi ;Xj 2 m(X;Pcon). Then, there exist xi 2 Xi and x j 2 Xj such that neither
xiPtx j nor x jPtxi, which contradicts that P is complete.
(ii) If P is acyclic, fxg 2 X for any x 2 X . Then (X ;P) = (X;Pcon). By
Theorem 5.2.1 and Theorem 5.3.1, we haveWS(X ;P) =MS(X ;P). 
5.3.2 A refinement over w-stable sets
Given an abstract decision problem, there may exist many w-stable sets. For
instance, if P is complete, any alternative from maximal strong components
is a w-stable set. In particular, any alternative is a w-stable set when P is a
dominance cycle including every alternative under consideration. Besides, a
w-stable set may exclude all maximal alternatives. Thus, it is necessary to
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refine the collection ofw-stable sets. For this purpose, we propose a selection
approach by means of which we could filter out more appealing w-stable sets.
Let (X ;P)2W(X) andM(X ;P)=SXi 2m(X;Pcon)Xi . We processM(X ;P)
in the following way:
Step 1 Choose alternatives fromM(X ;P) that are minimally dominated. Let
K(X ;P) be the set of these alternatives. Formally
K(X ;P) = fx 2M(X ;P) j b(x) b(y) f or any y 2M(X ;P)g:
Step 2 Choose alternatives from K(X ;P) that are maximally dominant. Let
Q(X ;P) be the set of these alternatives. Formally
Q(X ;P) = fx 2 K(X ;P) j d(x) d(y) f or any y 2 K(X ;P)g:
With the above auxiliary steps, we define the notion of refined w-stable sets
as follows.
Definition 5.3.2 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). W is called a refined w-stable set if
W 2WS(X ;P) andW  Q(X ;P):
Denote by WSr(X ;P) the collection of refined w-stable sets of (X ;P).
In order to understand the main point of this concept, we compute the
refined w-stable sets for (X ;P) in Figure 5.2.
Example 5.3.2 Reconsider (X ;P) in Figure 5.2. We have
M(X ;P) = fx1;x2;x3;x4;x6;x7;x8g:
As b(x1) = b(x4) = 2 and b(x2) = b(x3) = b(x6) = b(x7) = b(x8) = 1, we
have
K(X ;P) = fx2;x3;x6;x7;x8g:
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As d(x3) = 3, d(x2) = d(x6) = d(x8) = 2 and d(x7) = 1, we have Q(X ;P) =
fx3g. According to Theorem 5.3.1, we get that
WSr(X ;P) = ffx3gg whereas MSr(X ;P) = fx6;x7;x8g:
Since the cardinality of X is finite and m(X;Pcon) is nonempty, Step 1
and Step 2 are well-defined, it is easily verified that bothK(X ;P) andQ(X ;P)
are nonempty. Thus, we arrive at the following theorem.
Theorem 5.3.5 For any (X ;P) 2W(X), WSr(X ;P) is nonempty.
Proof. As both WS(X ;P) and Q(X ;P) are nonempty, nonempty refined w-
stable sets always can be obtained by using Step 1 and Step 2. 
Next, in order to figure out the advantages of w-stable, we investigate the
characteristics of the refined w-stable set for two types of abstract decision
problem respectively.
Theorem 5.3.6 Let (X ;P) 2W(X).
(i) If (X ;P) is strongly connected, then
WSr(X ;P) = ffxgjx 2 argmaxfd(x) j x 2 argminfb(x) j x 2 Xggg:
(ii) If P is complete, then
WSr(X ;P) = ffxgjcs(x) cs(y) f or all y 2 Xg:
Proof. (i) If (X ;P) is strongly connected, then
jm(X;Pcon)j= 1 and M(X ;P) = X ;
K(X ;P) = fxjx 2 argminfb(x) j x 2 Xgg;
Q(X ;P) = fxjx 2 argmaxfd(x) j x 2 x 2 K(X ;P)gg:
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By Theorem 5.3.1, we getWS(X ;P) = f fxg j x 2 Xg. Thus,
WSr(X ;P) = ffxgjx 2 argmaxfd(x) j x 2 argminfb(x) j x 2 Xggg:
(ii) If P is complete, then
jm(X;Pcon)j= 1; WS(X ;P) = ffxg j x 2M(X ;P)g;
argminfb(x) j x 2 Xg= argmaxfd(x) j x 2 Xg= argmaxfcs(x) j x 2 Xg:
Moreover, xPy for any x 2 M(X ;P) and y 2 X nM(X ;P); and for any z 2
X nfx;yg, if zPx, then zPy. Then, we get b(x)< b(y) and,
K(X ;P) = argminfb(x) j x 2 Xg and Q(X ;P) = argmaxfd(x) j x 2 Xgg:
Thus,WSr(X ;P) = ffxgjcs(x) cs(y) f or all y 2 Xg. 
Whenever P is a cycle containing every alternative under consideration,
refined w-stable sets are singletons which are chosen from those are dom-
inated by as few alternatives as possible and then, from these ones, those
which dominate as many alternatives as possible. The collection of refined w-
stable set solution agrees with the Copeland winner set when the dominance
relation is complete. As a comparison, the collection of refined generalized
stable sets coincides with the solution of unsurpassed set if the dominance
relation is complete.
Theorem 5.3.7 Let (X ;P) 2W(X). Then
(i) V  m(X ;P) f or any V 2WSr(X ;P) if m(X ;P) 6= /0;
(ii) V US(X ;P) for any V 2WSr(X ;P).
Proof. (i) If m(X ;P) 6= /0, then
m(X ;P)M(X ;R); K(X ;P) m(X ;P) and Q(X ;P) m(X ;P):
Thus V  m(X ;P) for any V 2WSr(X ;P).
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(ii) Take V 2WSr(X ;P) and x 2 V . By Theorem 5.3.6, there is an Xi 2
m(X;Pcon) with x 2 Xi . Suppose there exists a y 2 X with yPsx. Then yPx
and either b(x)> b(y) or b(x) = b(y) but d(x)> d(y). As Xi 2 m(X;Pcon),
y 2 Xi and y 2M(X ;P), which contradicts x 2 K(X ;P) if b(x) > b(y); and
x 2 Q(X ;P) if b(x) = b(y) but d(x)> d(y). 
It is easy to verify that a refined w-stable set could be a proper subset of
the maximal alternative set, and that a refined w-stable set might be strictly
included in the unsurpassed set. Hence, refined w-stable set may be treated
as refinements of both the maximal alternative set and the unsurpassed set.
In Subsection 4.3.3, we refined the collection of generalized stable sets
and formulated the solution of refined generalized stable sets. It has been
shown in Subsection 5.3.1 that any w-stable set is included some generalized
stable set. It is noteworthy that a refined w-stable is not necessarily included
in some refined generalized stable set. To clarify this point, consider the
following example.
Example 5.3.3 Consider (X ;P) in Figure 5.3. We have
WS(X ;P) = GS(X ;P) = ffx1g;fx2g;fx3g;fx4gg:
However, WSr(X ;P) = ffx1gg whereas GSr(X ;P) = ffx3gg:
By making a comparison with the Copeland winner set, the maximal
alternative set and the unsurpassed set, we have shown that the refined w-
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stable sets do possess desirable properties. Moreover, it is argued that the
solution of m-stable sets could not be refined in this way.
5.3.3 Concluding remark
In this section, we proposed the theory of w-stable sets which may be seen as
the reformulations of stable set theory and of m-stable set theory. Nonemp-
ty w-stable set always exists for every abstract decision problem. Moreover,
the notion of w-stable sets contains the notions of maximal alternative set and
of generalized stable sets whereas the notion of m-stable sets comprises the
notion of maximal alternative set and that of the admissible set. When dom-
inance relation is complete, w-stable set solution coincides with generalized
stable set solution while m-stable set solution agrees with the admissible set
solution. If dominance relation is acyclic,w-stable set solution is same as the
solution of m-stable sets. The fundamental differences between w-stable set
solution andm-stable set solution are: (i) anm-stable set may violate internal
stability while w-stable set retains this stability; (ii) an m-stable set prevents
an alternative in this set from being dominated by an alternative outside this
set but w-stable set solution permits the presence of such domination; (iii)
an m-stable set may include every alternative under consideration. In this
case, any decision process which selects alternative from this set violates
the notion of m-stability. However, every w-stable set is a proper subset of
the alternative set and any refinement of w-stable set preserves the notion of
w-stability.
5.4 Application in exchange market
In this section, we offer a case of exchange market with indivisible goods to
elaborate the application of w-stable set theory.
Consider a market with four agents N= f1;2;3;4g. Each agent i owns an
indivisible goods wi. An allocation is a permutation of the initial endowment
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(w1;w2;w3;w4). We assume that the feasible set of allocations X consists of
the following six elements:
b1 = (w1;w2;w3;w4); b2 = (w2;w4;w3;w1);
b3 = (w4;w2;w1;w3); b4 = (w2;w1;w4;w3);
b5 = (w4;w3;w2;w1); b6 = (w2;w1;w3;w4):
The preferences owned by the agents are listed as follows:
agent 1 : w2I1w4P1w1P1w3; agent 2 : w1I2w3P2w2P2w4;
agent 3 : w1P3w4I3w3P3w2; agent 4 : w1P4w3P4w4P4w2:
In this case, which allocation should be selected?
To solve this exchange market decision problem, a weaken dominance
relation over allocation set was proposed in [44, p865] as follows: An alloca-
tion x= (x1;x2;x3;x4) weakly dominates allocation y= (y1;y2;y3;y4), denot-
ed byDw, if there exists a coalition SN such that (i) fxi; i2 Sg= fyi; i2 Sg;
(ii) either xiPiyi or xiIiyi for any i 2 S; (iii) there is j 2 S with x jPiy j. Then, it
can be verified that
b1Dwb2 through f2g; b1Dwb5 through f3g and b2Dwb5 through f3g;
b3Dwb1 through N; b3Dwb2 through f2g and b4Dwb1 through N;
b4Dwb2 through f1;2g; b4Dwb3 through f1;2g and b4Dwb6 through fNg;
b5Dwb1 through f1;4g; b5Dwb3 through f1;4g and b5Dwb4 through f1;4g;
b5Dwb6 through f1;4g; b6Dwb1 through N; and b6Dwb2 through f1;2g :
b6Dwb3 through f1;2g and b6Dwb5 through f3g:
Dw is represented in Figure 5.4. Since Dw is not asymmetric in this case, we
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may take the asymmetric part of Dw denoted byDa as a reference dominance
relation which is presented in Figure 5.5. Clearly, for any bi (where 1 
i  6), there always exists a b j with b jDabi. Moreover, (X ;Da) is strongly
connected. Thus, we have:
m(X ;Da) = S(X ;Da) = /0;
MS(X ;Da) = fXg andMSr(X ;Da) = X ;
WS(X ;Da) = ffb1g;fb2g;fb3g;fb4g;fb5g;fb6gg:
Due to b(b1) = b(b3) = 3, b(b2) = 4, b(b4) = b(b5) = b(b6) = 1, we get
K(X ;P) = fb4; b5; b6g:
Moreover, due to d(b4) = 4; d(b5) = 2 and d(b6) = 3, we have
Q(X ;P) = fb4g andWSr(X ;Da) = ffb4gg:
In this case, the unique m-stable set includes every alternative under
consideration. It does not discriminate alternatives at all. Any further de-
cision process that produces allocations from this set violates the notion of
m-stability. That means, there always exists an unchosen allocation that dom-
inates the chosen outcomes (i.e., the produced allocation). However, this is
not true for w-stable set. Within the framework of w-stability, we may find a
more discriminating w-stable set.
Part III
Conclusion and Summary

Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis, a decision problem is abstractly formulated as a pair that con-
sists of an alternative set and a dominance relation. This abstract conceptual
framework does not specify whether the alternatives are personal or collec-
tive. Neither does it tell how to formulate this dominance relation. We pro-
ceed in such a way that the formulation of solutions does not involve factors
other than the dominance relation. The advantage of this approach is the
general applicability of the results.
It appears that there are two distinct ways to solve abstract decision prob-
lems. One is the notion of maximality. This notion follows the fact that
alternatives should be selected when they are maximal according to a certain
binary relation. The other one is the notion of stability. This concept captures
the idea that selected alternatives (together) satisfy internal stability and ex-
ternal stability described as standards of behavior. The solutions discussed
in Part I comply with the notion of maximality in the sense that each of them
chooses alternatives which are maximal in termed of a derived binary rela-
tion of P. In contrast, every solution considered in Part II abides by the idea
of stability. The solution concepts discussed there are modifications of the
stability criteria formulated by [66]. As we have shown, all these solutions
exist for every possible abstract decision problem.
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Solution Maximality and Stability
Admissible set AD(X ;P) = m(X ;cPt) 2 S(X ;cPt)
Uncovered set UC(X ;P) = m(X ;Pc) 2 S(X ;Pc)
Copeland winner set CW (X ;P) = m(X ;Pco) 2 S(X ;Pco)
Unsurpassed set US(X ;P) = m(X ;Ps) 2 GS(X ;Ps)
Generalized stable set m(X ;P)V 2 GS(X ;P) = S(X ;Pt)
Extended stable set m(X ;P)W 2 ES(X ;P) = S(X ;Pw)
M-stable set fm(X ;P)g[fAD(X ;P)g MS(X ;P)
W-stable set fm(X ;P)g[GS(X ;P)WS(X ;P)
Table 6.1 Maximality and Stability in Solutions
The solutions discussed in Part I not only can be treated as variations of
maximal alternative set, but also may be seen as variants of the stable set so-
lution. In contrast, the solutions studied in Part II are proposed as variations
of the stable set solution while they may also be regarded as extensions of
the maximal alternative set solution. These findings are roughly summarized
in Table 6.1.
More specifically, the admissible set chooses alternatives which are max-
imal with respect to the strict t-dominance relation cPt . It is also a stable
set defined in terms of cPt , as we showed in Theorem 2.2.5. The uncovered
set solution is made up of alternatives which are maximal with regard to the
covering relation Pc. But it is also a stable set defined in terms of Pc, as
proved in Theorem 2.3.5. The Copeland winner set comprises alternatives
which are maximal pertaining to the co-dominance relation Pco. However, it
is also a stable set defined in terms of Pco, as we clarified in Theorem 3.2.3.
The unsurpassed set consists of alternatives which are maximal with respect
to the surpassing relation Ps. Yet, it is also a generalized stable set defined
in terms of Ps, which is guaranteed by the fact that the surpassing relation is
acyclic and the conclusion in Corollary 4.2.2.
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In contrast, the solutions of generalized stable sets and of extended stable
sets are stable sets which are defined separately for t-dominance relation Pt
and w-dominance relation Pw . Since both solutions are core-inclusive, as we
have shown in Theorem 4.2.5 and Theorem 4.3.6, both of them can be con-
sidered as an extension of the maximal alternative set as well. The solution
of m-stable sets comprises both the maximal alternative set and the admissi-
ble set while the solution of w-stable sets contains the maximal alternative
set and generalized stable sets. Thus, as a reformulation of stable set solu-
tion, both of them are compatible with the notion of the maximal alternative
set and a variation of stable set solution.
As we have shown, all the solutions presented in this thesis are formulat-
ed by using either dominance relation P or its derivatives. In order to further
clarify the relations between these solutions, it is necessary to display the
relations between P and its derivatives. In fact, a hierarchical inclusion rela-
tion can be established between P and its derivatives, as described in Figure
6.1 where Pi ) Pk means Pi  Pk . This inclusion relation can be directly
derived from Definition 1.2.4, Theorem 3.3.1 and Theorem 4.3.1. This figure
expresses the facts that given two distinct alternatives x and y, if xPcy, then
xPsy implies xPy and xPcoy; and if xPy, then xPwy implies xPty; and if xcPty,
then xPty.
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If P is complete Pw = Pt
If P is acyclic P= Pw and Pt =cPt
If P is transitive Pc = Ps = P= Pw = Pt =cPt  Pco
Table 6.2 Coincidences between P and its Derivatives
CW (X ;P)US(X ;P)UC(X ;P) AD(X ;P)
If P is complete GS(X ;P) = ES(X ;P) =WS(X ;P)
MS(X ;P) = fAD(X ;P)g
GS(X ;P) = fm(X ;P)g= fAD(X ;P)g
If P is acyclic ES(X ;P) = S(X ;P)
MS(X ;P) =WS(X ;P)
CW (X ;P) m(X ;P) = AD(X ;P)
AD(X ;P) =UC(X ;P) =US(X ;P)
If P is transitive S(X ;P) = ES(X ;P) = GS(X ;P) = fm(X ;P)g
MS(X ;P) =WS(X ;P) = 2m(X ;P) n /0
Table 6.3 Inclusion Relations between Solutions
In addition, it is worth noting that Pw is the same as Pt if P is complete.
Moreover, if P is acyclic, then Pw coincides with P whereas Pt agrees withcPt . In particular, P equals its derivatives in Figure 6.1 except Pco when P
is transitive 1(in this case Pco is a super-relation of P). These conclusions
are summarized in Table 6.2. Under these assumptions concerning with P,
the inclusion relation and equivalence relation between these solutions are
briefly summarized in Table 6.3.
Finally, as we have clarified, all the solutions presented in Part I follow
the maximality concept and always exist for every abstract decision problem.
The solutions discussed in Part II are in accordance with the notion of sta-
1 Let x;y 2 X and P be transitive. If xPty, then either xPy or there exists a sequence
of x1;x2; : : : ;xm with xPx1, x1Px2, : : :, xmPy implying xPy. Thus P = Pt . If xPy, then zPx
implies zPy for any z 2 X and yPk implies xPk for any k 2 X . Thus xPy implying xPcoy.
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bility and nonempty for any abstract decision problem. Moreover, it is not
difficult to verify that all these solutions discussed in this thesis agree with
the best alternative set whenever this set exists. Based on these facts, we con-
clude that the solutions studied in Part I may answer Question 1 formulated
in Section 1.3.1 while the solutions discussed in Part II can be regarded as
answers for Question 2 as mapped out in Chapter 1.3.2.
As we showed in Chapter 2, the theory of uncovered set refines the ad-
missible set theory in the domain of tournaments. Thus, it is fair to say that
the uncovered set solution is a more refined answer for Question 1 than the
admissible set solution if dominance relation is complete. Moreover, it has
been proved in Chapter 3 that the unsurpassed set is contained in the uncov-
ered set and includes the Copeland winner set no matter whether dominance
relation is complete or not. In view of this, both the solutions of Copeland
winner set and of unsurpassed set are more refined answers for Question 1
than the uncovered set solution. As we have argued in Section 3.3, the un-
surpassed set refines the uncovered set in a more convincing way than the
Copeland winnner set. Based on this fact, we conclude that the unsurpassed
set solution is a more convincing answer for Question 1 than the Copeland
winner set solution. Besides, as we have shown in in Part I, all of these so-
lutions may not discriminate among alternatives when dominance relation
is cyclic and incomplete. That means, these variations of the maximal al-
ternative set might be powerless in discriminating among alternatives when
dominance relation is incomplete.
As we have proved in Chapter 4, extended internal stability lies in be-
tween internal stability and generalized internal stability while extended ex-
ternal stability is in between external stability and generalized external sta-
bility. Based on this fact, we conclude that as a variation of stable set, the
stability of extended stable set lies closer to the stability of stable set than
that of generalized stable set. The solutions of m-stable sets and of w-stable
sets discussed in Chapter 5 both are compatible with the maximal alterna-
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tive set solution in the sense that the maximal alternative set satisfies both
the notions of m-stable sets and of w-stable sets. In this respect, as answer-
s for Question 2, both variations distinguish themselves from the solutions
of stable sets, of generalized stable sets and of extended stable sets. As we
showed, anm-stable set may coincide with the entire alternative set while any
w-stable set is properly included in the alternative set. Moreover, a decision
process that generates alternatives from an m-stable set may violate the no-
tion of m-stability whereas any decision process that produces alternative(s)
from a w-stable set preservers the notion of w-stability. For this reason, we
conclude that the solution ofw-stable sets might be a more acceptable answer
for Question 2 than that of m-stable sets. Lastly, it is important to emphasize
that extended stable set, generalized stable and w-stable set all are proper
subset of the alternative set in general. That means, all of them are more
decisive than the variations of the maximal alternative set discussed in Part I
in discriminating among alternatives.
Chapter 7
Summary
Before we end this thesis, we summarize briefly the main conclusions of
each chapter and clarify the intrinsic links between these conclusions. By
doing so, readers may better understand what the essential points of each
chapter are.
In Chapter 1, we first built a general analysis framework for abstract
decision problems. Then we introduced elementary digraph theory which
facilitates greatly the representation of abstract decision problems and the
characterization of their solutions. After that, we presented the theories of
maximal alternative set and of stable set which are two well-known solutions
for abstract decision problems. As both solutions may not exist in abstrac-
t decision problems whose dominance relations are cyclic, we raised two
research questions in order to figure out whether there exist nonempty varia-
tions of the maximal alternative set and of stable set. The remaining sections
of this thesis were respectively dedicated to answering these two research
questions.
In Chapter 2, we discussed the solutions of admissible set and of un-
covered set. It has been shown that both of them are core-inclusive and
nonempty for every abstract decision problem. The uncovered set refines the
admissible set in the domain of tournaments. Moreover, the admissible set
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may include Pareto suboptimal alternatives while the uncovered set preclude
the presence of Pareto suboptimal alternatives when dominance relation is
derived from pairwise majority comparison. Based on these two facts, it was
argued that the theory of uncovered set outperforms the theory of admissible
set in the domain of tournaments. However, the uncovered set is not nec-
essarily contained in the admissible set if dominance relation is incomplete.
On the one hand, the solution of admissible set is free from being dominated
by alternatives outside this set whereas the uncovered set solution does not
possess this property. On the other hand, any alternative outside the uncov-
ered set is dominated by some alternative inside this set while the admissible
set is not provided with this feature. Finally, it is important to point out that
the uncovered set and the admissible set both may include every alternative
under consideration. Accordingly, we believe that neither the admissible set
nor the uncovered set has a satisfactory resoluteness in discriminating among
alternatives.
In Chapter 3, we studied the solutions of Copeland winner set and of un-
surpassed set which both are the maximal alternative sets defined in terms
of derived binary relations of P. It has been proved that both the Copeland
winner set and the unsurpassed set are nonempty for every abstract decision
problem, and that both of them refine the uncovered set. Moreover, both so-
lutions are proper subsets of the alternative set if dominance relation is com-
plete and irregular. Consequently, we conclude that the Copeland winner set
and the unsurpassed set both are more decisive solution than the uncovered
set. The theory of unsurpassed set differs from that of Copeland winner set in
the following aspects. First, the Copeland winner set might be a dominated
subset of the uncovered set while this is not true for the unsurpassed set. Nex-
t, the Copeland winner set may preclude every maximal alternative while the
unsurpassed set includes the whole maximal alternative set. In view of these
differences, we judge that the unsurpassed set is a more convincing refine-
ment of the uncovered set than the Copeland winner set. Besides, it is worth
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emphasizing that both the Copeland winner set and the unsurpassed set may
agree with the whole alternative set when dominance relation is incomplete
and irregular. Thus, neither the Copleand winner set nor the unsurpassed set
is a decisive solution in general.
In Chapter 4, we explored the theory of generalized stable sets and that
of extended stable sets that follow the idea of stability criteria formulated
by [66]. It has been shown that generalized stable sets and extend stable sets
both exist for every abstract decision problem. Stable set solution and its two
extensions have the following common features. Firstly, all of them are core-
inclusive. Secondly, all of these solutions are free from inner contradiction.
Thirdly, none of them is free from being dominated by an alternative outside
the choice set. At the same time, the theories of generalized stable sets and
of extended stable sets both have features not possessed by stable set theo-
ry. First, given an abstract decision problem, stable set may not exist while
generalized stable set and extended stable set always exist. Second, both
generalized stable sets and extended stable sets have the same cardinal num-
bers, but this is not true for stable sets. Third, the solutions of generalized
stable sets and of extended stable sets have the property of strong componen-
t consistency while stable set solution does not have this property. Fourth,
generalized stable set and extended stable set are sensitive to the reinforce-
ment of alternative outside the choice set and the alternations of dominance
relation between alternatives outside this set. In contrast, stable set solution
is independent from enlarging the dominion of any alternative outside this
solution and changing the dominance relation among alternative outside this
set. Finally, it is meaningful to point out that both generalized stable sets and
extended stable sets are proper subsets of the alternative set irrespective of
the completeness or incompleteness of a dominance relation. Generally, this
is not the case for the solutions discussed in Part I.
In Chapter 5, we investigated the theories ofm-stable sets and of w-stable
sets which both solve the existence problem of solution. Since the maximal
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alternative set is both an m-stable set and a w-stable set, the solutions of
m-stable sets and of w-stable sets both are compatible with the maximal al-
ternative set. Note that, this is true for neither the notion of stable sets, nor
the notion of generalized stable sets, nor the notion of extended stable set-
s. The theory of m-stable sets and that of w-stable sets both have an aspect
of stability. That is, both theories prevent a selected alternative from being
t-dominated by another alternative. The fundamental differences between
them is that the theory of m-stable sets puts this stability outside the solution
while the theory of w-stable sets leaves this stability inside the solution. In
our views, the preference for these two theories is the preference over the
two forms of stability. As we have shown, when an m-stable set coincides
with the whole alternative set, to yield a solution for this abstract decision
problem, any decision process that generates alternatives from this m-stable
set may go against the notion of m-stability. As a comparison, any w-stable
set is a proper subset of the alternative set and any decision process that
generates alternatives from a w-stable set always preserves the notion of w-
stability. For this reason, it might be fair to say that the theory of w-stable
sets should be preferred to the the theory of m-stable sets.
In Chapter 6, we discussed the general conclusions with respect to the
maximality and stability of solutions that were presented in this thesis. We
not only showed the relationships among these solutions, but also returned to
our research questions to explain further in which way our research questions
are answered.
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